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Summary
IP  m u lticast is a  p rom isin g  com m u nication  m o del for group oriented app lication s. U nfortunately, 
the strength o f  m u lticast is  a lso  its secu rity  w eak n ess; the anonym ous receiver m odel in m u lticast 
is b a se d  on a  sin gle  m u lticast ad d ress, rather than exp lic itly  listin g the m em bers, a llow  m u lticast 
to sc a le  to virtually  any group  size . T h is co m p lica tes confidentiality  w hich  requ ires ind iv idual and 
exp lic it identification  o f  the m em bers in  order to m ak e sure that on ly  legitim ate  m em bers are ab le  
to a c c e ss  the m u lticast data  stream . In this th esis, w e concentrate on one o f  the m ain  areas in 
m u lticast security  -  confidentiality .
In cen tralised  design , w e fo cu s on the e ffic ien cy  o f  the k ey  tree approach . F o r ind iv idual 
rekey in g, w e have p ro p o sed  an algorithm  that co n sid ers several related  m u lticast se ss io n s a s a 
w h ole and  the balan ce o f  the k ey  tree to m in im ise  the com m unication  co sts  and key  storage 
n eed ed  b y  the group  controller and m em bers. In ca se s  w here the m u lticast app lication s do  not 
require strict secrecy , it is p o ss ib le  to co n so lid ate  the jo in in g  and departin g m em bers and rekey  
them  as a  w hole. W e h ave p ro p o se d  three algorith m s that m aintain  the b a lan ce  o f  the k ey  tree 
ov er tim e w hen m em bers jo in  and/or depart the m u lticast se ssio n  w ithout add in g extra netw ork 
co sts.
T o  av o id  perform an ce bottlen eck  and sin g le  poin t o f  failure prob lem s, a  d istribu ted design  that 
partitions the group  m em bers into several a reas is  p referred  over a  cen tra lised  design . M obility  
ad d s another d im ension  o f  co m p lex ity  to the d e sign  by  a llow in g m em bers not on ly  to jo in  or 
depart the group but a lso  transfer betw een  areas. W e have p ro p o sed  one algorithm  that tries to 
m in im ise  the com m unication  co sts  w hen m em bers jo in  the group and m em bers transfer betw een 
areas.
K e y  w ords: G roup  K e y  M an agem en t, Secu re M u lticast, Secure G roup C om m u n ication s
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C h a p t e r  1
1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
With the widespread use o f  the Internet, secure data transmissions is an important requirement for 
many applications. Secure group communication has several applications in multimedia 
conferencing, online stock updates, pay-per-view and collaborative work. Some o f  these 
applications engage in one to many communication while others involve many to many 
communication. Multicasting is an efficient way to distribute data stream to a group o f  receivers 
but it also poses several unique security issues. Responding to these issues in multicast, the work 
has been divided into several areas and w e will be concentrating on one o f  the areas, 
confidentiality, in this thesis.
1.1 Multicast
Internet Protocol (IP) multicast communication [1][2] is an efficient way to distribute data stream 
to multiple destinations simultaneously over the Internet. Although multicast can be achieved by 
using multiple point-to-point messages (unicast approach), mechanisms that enable multi­
destinations delivery using a single group address can provide greater efficiency. This allows 
better utilisation o f  the network resources (less traffic) and sender resources (one transmission 
serves all recipients). It has been shown that for a group size as small as 20 to 40 group members 
offers a 55-70%  reduction in the number o f  links traversed when compared to separately deliver 
in unicast format [3]. Applications that can benefit from use o f  IP multicast are online stock 
updates, video conferencing, online gaming, software updates, m obile-com m erce, etc [4][5][6] 
[7] [8].
Multicast communication is about communicating from one sender to a group o f  receivers. The 
group o f  receivers is called the multicast group and is a central concept for multicast 
communication. This group does not have any physical or geographical boundaries (i.e. the 
receivers can be located anywhere on the Internet). Typical characteristics o f  a multicast group 
include [9]:
• Openness to new members: A  group can be open or closed with regard to new members. 
In an open group, any new member can receive the multicast traffic without any 
registration with the sender. In other words, the group o f  members is transparent to the
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sender, and the sender is not aware o f  the exact identity o f  all the receivers. O f  course, 
this does not exclude the possibility that some o f  the receivers from the group are actually 
known to the sender. On the other hand, in a closed group all the receivers are known.
• Openness to senders: A  group can also be closed or open with regard to senders. In a 
closed group, only registered senders can send messages to this closed group. In contrast, 
data from any sender can be forwarded to open groups.
• Dynamics: In static groups, membership o f  the group is predetermined and does not 
change during an established communication. In dynamic groups, membership can 
change during communication.
• Lifetime: Regarding the group lifetime, a distinction can be made between permanent 
groups and transient groups. A  permanent group exists even i f  it currently has no 
members, whereas a transient group exists only as long as the group has members.
• Heterogeneity: It is also possible to differentiate between heterogeneous and 
homogeneous groups. In heterogeneous groups, the members have different capabilities, 
for example, with respect to their network connection (e.g. in terms o f  available 
bandwidth or connectivity -  continuous versus intermittent). On the other hand, in 
homogeneous groups all members have the same capabilities.
• Security: The multicast communication has certain security requirements, which might be 
static for the duration o f  the whole communication, or they can vary during the 
communication. M oreover, the requirements may differ for the different data involved 
(e.g. video, audio, and text).
In order for multicast to scale to large group, the receivers do not directly contact the sender(s) to 
express their interest in receiving the data. Instead, each receiver sends a message to the first hop 
multicast router that it is interested in receiving data sent to a particular multicast group. 
Specifically, receivers use the Internet Group Management Protocol (IGM P) [10 ][11] for IPv4 or 
Multicast Listener D iscovery (M LD ) [12][13] for IPv6 to express their interest in receiving data 
sent to a given group. Upon receiving this jo in  request, the first hop multicast router runs with 
other routers a multicast routing protocol, such as Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM) 
[14][15][16], Distance Vector Multicast Routing Protocol (D VM R P) [17] or Multicast Extension 
to Open Shortest Path First (M OSPF) [18], that allows to graft the new member to the multicast 
distribution tree. When a receiver departs from the session, its first hop multicast router prunes it 
from  the multicast tree, i f  there is no longer any interested party in that attached segments. This 
m odel is beneficial because it favours scalability -  veiy  little state information is required, and it 
provides some anonymity for the group members [19][20],
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1.2 Multicast Security Issues
W hile the advantages o f  multicasting are clear, there are several obstacles for widespread 
deployment [21] [22] [23]. The popular applications o f  the Internet are based on unicast, and are 
dependent on the reliability and sometimes security o f  the transmission. M ost applications use 
hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) [24], file transfer protocol (FTP) [25], which run over 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [26] for reliability, and most e-com m erce applications mn 
over the secure socket layer (SSL) [27] for security. End-users and application service providers 
(ASPs) do expect some form  o f  reliability and security for multicast communication as well and 
most applications today need tight control over w ho can transmit data to a set o f  receivers.
Charging for software downloads, and monthly subscription to digital libraries and on-line 
magazines, is comm onplace on the Internet. Content providers can charge for unicast data transfer 
rather easily on the Internet. The same cannot be said for multicast applications. This is mainly 
due to the anonymous receiver model o f  IP multicast. A ny member can request to receive data, 
and the sender has not control over group membership.
The only way to ensure controlled access to data is to encrypt the multicast data and distribute the 
encryption key to all authorised members. In other words, secure multicast enables content 
providers to enforce access control, and thus be able to charge for multicast data services. Access 
control is only one o f  the motivating factors for secure multicast communications. Applications in
general may need [23][28] [29]:
• Privacy: Ensure that certain information is never disclosed to unauthorised entities. It is 
required only when the data is to be kept secret.
• Authentication'. Receivers need to be able to establish the source o f  the data, thereby 
preventing an intruder from masquerading as a legitimate source o f  the message.
• Integrity: Receivers must be able to determine that data has not been modified either by 
other members o f  the multicast group or by external adversaries. This is to avoid 
accepting packets that have been m odified by a hostile node, while in transit.
• Non-repudiation: The originator o f  the message cannot deny having sent the message. It 
is useful for detection and isolation o f  compromised nodes.
• Availability'. Ensure that the intended network services are available to the intended 
parties when required.
Although mature security controls and techniques exist to deal with most o f  these requirements 
and provide secure unicast communication, unicast controls cannot be directly applied to the 
multicast communication. The security mechanisms for unicast are not adequate for the multicast
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scenario since multicast security mechanisms are under tightly scalability and efficiency 
constraints [9], Therefore, responding to the security issues in multicast, the work has been 
divided into several areas, including:
• Multicast data confidentiality: In unicast communication, two members can achieve 
confidentiality by encrypting the communicating data with a shared key. In multicast 
communication, a group key is distributed to all authorised members. This group key is 
used by the sender as a symmetric key to encrypt the multicast data. This becom es 
complicated when group membership is dynamic (members jo in  and/or depart 
continuously during the multicast session). Research work in group key management 
aims to provide efficient rekeying schemes for dynamic groups [30][31][32][33][34].
• Multicast sender and receiver access control'. In the basic IP multicast model, anyone can 
send data to a multicast group, and anyone can becom e a member o f  any multicast group. 
It is clear that this model is vulnerable to Denial o f  Service (D oS) attacks, where 
malicious members jo in  or send data to multicast groups only to waste bandwidth or to 
overwhelm other group members with garbage data or malicious code. Solving these 
problems requires controlling the ability o f  members to send or to jo in  a multicast tree 
distribution to receive the data. These are called sender access control and receiver access 
control respectively. Although this could potentially solve big issues o f  D oS, they will 
need to have support in the routing infrastructure adding therefore to the complexity and, 
possibly, hindering the scalability [35].
• Multicast source authentication: In a two party communication, data authentication can 
be achieved through a purely symmetric mechanism: the sender and the receiver share a 
secret key to compute a Message Authentication Code (M A C ) o f  all communicated data. 
When a message with a correct M A C  arrives, the receiver is assured that the sender 
generated that message. In multicast environment where all receivers are mutually 
untrusted, symmetric M A C  authentication becom es less secure: every receiver knows the 
M A C  key, and could thus impersonate the sender and forge messages to other receivers. 
On the other hand, the computation com plexity o f  producing and verifying digital 
signatures, as well as the length o f  the signature, may be significant. Therefore, more 
efficient solution is needed [33][34][36].
• Watermarking: Encryption is generally used to safeguard content while it is being 
transmitted so that unauthorised member cannot obtain useful information, but this offers 
no protection after the intended member receivers the data. There is no protection against 
unauthorised duplication and propagation by  the intended receiver. Watermarking can 
provide protection in the form  o f  theft deterrence. Watermarking [37] [38] is the process
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o f  embedding data into a multimedia element such as image and audio video. This 
embedded data can later be extracted from, or detected in, the multimedia for security 
purposes [30][33][34].
W e notice that there are serious conflicts between multicast scalability mechanism and security. 
Indeed, the anonymous receiver model in multicast based on a single multicast address, rather 
than explicitly listing the members, allows multicast to scale to virtually any group size. This 
simplicity which makes the strength o f  multicast routing, however, presents many vulnerabilities 
[30] [3 9]. On the other hand, confidentiality requires individual and explicit identification o f  the 
members in order to provide them with the correct keys to access the encrypted data stream. 
M oreover, large groups with highly dynamic members present serious scalability issues for group 
key management and distribution. In the case o f  authentication, the problem is not related to the 
group size explicitly but rather to the requirement o f  an efficient asymmetric mechanism to 
prevent the receivers from impersonating the sender. Additionally, as most o f  the media- 
streaming applications based on multicast rely on a best effort channel, those asymmetric 
authentication mechanisms must tolerate packet loss.
1.3 Multicast Security Scenarios
Based on the characteristics o f  a multicast group outlined above, it takes many parameters to 
characterise a multicast security scenario, and a large number o f  potential scenarios exist. 
Different scenarios call for different solutions; it seems unlikely that a single solution will 
accommodate all scenarios. Tw o very different scenarios for secure multicast have been presented 
in [40][41].
• Single source broadcast
Here a single source wishes to continuously broadcast data to a large number o f  passive 
recipients. The source can be a news agency that broadcasts share-quotes and news-feeds 
to paying customers, or a Pay-TV station. Some o f  the characteristics are:
>  The number o f  recipients can be up to hundreds o f  thousands and more. The 
source is typically a top-end machine with ample resources. It can also be 
parallelised or split to several source in different locations. The recipients are 
typically lower-end machines with limited resources. Consequently, the security 
solution must optimise for efficiency at the recipient side.
>  The lifetime o f  the group is usually long. Yet, the group membership is dynamic: 
members jo in  and depart at a relatively high rate. In addition, a high volume o f  
sign-on/sign-off requests are expected at peak times. It can be assumed that
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members have a long-term relationship with the group; this may facilitate 
processing o f  sign-on/sign-off requests.
>  The volume o f  transmitted data may vary considerably: i f  only text is being 
transmitted then the volume is relatively low  (and the latency requirements are 
quite relaxed); i f  audio/video is transmitted (e.g. pay-per-view) then the volume 
can be veiy  high and veiy  little latency is allowed.
>  Authenticity o f  the transmitted data is a crucial concern and should be strictly 
maintained: a client must never accept a forged share-quote as authentic. Another 
important concern is preventing non-members from  using the service. This can be 
achieved by encrypting the data.
>  The required latency o f  the communication varies from application to application. 
Member revocation would be performed within minutes or seconds from the time 
it is requested.
>  There is typically a natural group owner that manages access-control as well as 
key management. However, the sender o f  data may be a different entity.
• Virtual conferences
Typically virtual conference scenarios may include on-line meetings o f  corporate 
executives or committees, interactive lectures and classes, and multi-party video games.
>  A  virtual conference involves several tens to hundreds o f  peers, often with 
roughly similar computational resources. Usually most, or all, group members 
may a-priori wish to transmit data.
>  The group is often formed per event and is relatively short-lived (say few  minutes 
or hours). Membership is often static: members jo in  at start-up, and remain signed 
on throughout. Furthermore, cryptographically revoke this group membership. 
Bandwidth and latency requirements vary from application to application, 
similarly to the case o f  single source broadcast. However, latency should 
typically be very small in order to facilitate the simultaneity and interactivity o f  
virtual conferences.
>  Authenticity o f  data may be the most crucial security concern.
1.4 Research Goals and Objectives
The overall contribution o f  this thesis is in the area o f  multicast data confidentiality. Although 
group key agreement schemes have been proposed for virtual conference scenarios where all
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members cooperate with one another to derive a com m on group key to secure the multicast data, 
w e will, however, focus on group key distribution where there exists a trusted entity, known as the 
Group Controller (G C), responsible for generating and distributing a com m on group key to the 
members. The use o f  a specialised GC generally benefits scenarios such as single source 
broadcast where the group size is very large.
The primaiy goal o f  this thesis is to propose scalable group key management schemes for large 
dynamic groups. The proposed group key management schemes should satisfy the follow ing 
objectives:
• A chieve better efficiency compared to the existing schemes;
• Minimise the number o f  keys held by  the GC and group members;
• Minimise the number o f  communication costs for each rekeying operation;
• Reduce the computation powers needed by the GC and group members;
• Be feasible to implement.
1.5 Research Issues and Problems
B elow  are some o f  the identified issues and problems that have been tackled in this thesis.
• Several related multicast sessions should be considered as a whole to minimise the 
communication costs and key storage needed by the GC and the group members.
• The efficiency o f  the key tree approach depends critically on whether the key tree remains 
balanced. A  key tree is considered balanced i f  the distance from  the root to any two leaf 
nodes differs by not more than one. A n unbalanced key tree results in dissimilar storage 
among group members. In addition, the communication costs may be higher.
• There are issues at the receivers’ side regardless o f  whether the multicast data stream are 
halted or continue to flow  during rekeying. Halting the data stream adds waiting latency 
which may affect real-time applications. On the other hand, i f  the data stream continues to 
flow  during rekeying, it causes buffering problem for receivers with limited storage since 
they need to buffer all packets before they can decrypted.
• In distributed architecture, mobility complicates the design by allowing members not only 
to jo in  and depart the group but also transfer between different areas. I f  the mobile 
members transfer between areas frequently, the communications costs can be veiy 
significant i f  the member movement is not taken into consideration.
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1.6 Achievements
Our detailed achievements are as follow s:
• W e have proposed Multi-Layer Balanced Logical K ey Hierarchy (M LB -LK H ) that treats 
several related multicast sessions as a whole. In addition, M LB -LK H  also considers the 
balance o f  the key tree since it affects the communication cost and key storage efficiency. 
T o further enhance the efficiency o f  our M LB-LK H , we have proposed two optimisations 
that try to reduce the data and key storage needed by the members during rekeying. 
Simulation result shows that our M LB-LK H  reduces the communication costs and storage 
needed by the GC and group members significantly compared to traditional approach.
• W e have proposed three algorithms, two Merging Algorithms and a Batch Balanced 
Algorithm, which are suitable for batch rekeying. These three algorithms tiy to maintain 
the balance o f  the key tree over time as members jo in  or depart. In other words, all three 
algorithms try to minimise the difference in height in the key tree without adding extra 
communication costs. Merging Algorithm 1 and 2 are only suitable for batch jo in  events. 
Our Merging Algorithms provide a good  compromise compared to existing algorithms, 
producing a balanced key tree with low  communication costs. T o additionally handle 
batch depart event, we extend the two Merging Algorithms into a Batch Balanced 
Algorithm. Our Batch Balanced Algorithm outperforms existing algorithms when the 
number o f  joining members is greater than the number o f  departing members and when 
there are lot o f  departing members with no joining members. For similar numbers o f  
joining and departing members, our Batch Balanced Algorithm achieves the same 
performance as existing algorithms.
• For distributed design, we have proposed Member Consolidation Delayed Rekeying 
(M C D R ) that tries to minimise the communication costs when a static or mobile member 
joins the group in an area and when a mobile member transfers between areas. W e 
achieve it by consolidating these members in a list. Doing so does not affect any member 
since all o f  them have the group key to decrypt the multicast data stream and M C D R  does 
not compromise the strict secrecy requirement, where only authorised members can 
decrypt the multicast data. The members in the list will hold valid auxiliary keys when 
there is a depart events or the number o f  members in the list reaches a threshold. 
Compared to existing schemes, our proposed M C D R  achieves the efficiency close to 
batch rekeying but does not trade-off any security for that.
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1.7 Thesis outline
The remaining o f  the thesis is structured as follow s:
Chapter 2 gives an overview o f  multicast and security. W e also discuss the difference between IP 
multicast group and secure multicast group.
Chapter 3 discusses some o f  the standardisation work that have been proposed in literature. 
Specifically, a Reference Framework has been proposed to address the fundamental problem in 
managing the keying material. It tries to express the com plex multicast security question from the 
perspective o f  problem classification (i.e., the three problem areas), architectures (i.e. centralised 
and distributed), multicast types (i.e. one-to-many or many-to-many), and protocols (i.e. the 
exchanged messages).
Chapter 4 presents group key management as the core mechanism for achieving confidentiality 
and access control in multicast communication. The goal o f  a group key management protocol is 
to provide legitimate group members with up-to-date cryptographic materials they need for 
secrecy and authentication throughout the life o f  the group. In order to achieve this goal, three 
protocols (i.e. registration protocol, rekey protocol and data security protocol) have been defined. 
Finally, we review some o f  the existing work that has been proposed in centralised and distributed 
design.
Chapter 5 investigates the efficiency o f  the key tree approach and describes how  an unbalanced 
key tree may affect the key storage needed by the group members and increase the 
communication costs. W e show how we can create a balanced key tree for several related 
multicast sessions for our M LB-LK H . W e observe some issues at the receiver side regardless o f  
whether the multicast data streams are halted or continue to flow  during rekeiyng. T o  alleviate 
these issues, we have proposed two optimisations to further enhance the efficiency o f  our M LB - 
LKH.
Chapter 6 describes our three algorithms, two Merging Algorithms and a Batch Balanced 
Algorithm, that have been proposed to create a balanced key tree over time when members jo in  or 
depart for batch rekeying. W e also provide best and worst theoretical analysis for our three 
algorithms. Finally, we discuss some scenarios where our algorithms can outperform existing 
work.
Chapter 7 presents a distributed architecture that considers member mobility between different 
GCs. W e observe that allowing a m obile member to hold several set o f  valid auxiliary keys does 
not compromise the security as long as all the keys it possesses are updated when it departs from 
the multicast group. W e describe how our M C D R  minimise the communication costs for join, 
depart, transfers in and out events.
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Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and opens venues for further research.
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C h a p t e r  2
2  B a c k g r o u n d
The growth o f  the Internet inspires lot o f  network applications, and many o f  them are based on 
group communication models, where a message originated from a source has to be sent to an 
arbitrary number o f  receivers in the group. Group communications can take advantages o f  a more 
efficient multicast service which is capable o f  sending a message to multiple destinations. 
However, multicast poses several unique security issues due to its open nature.
2.1 Multicast
Internet Protocol (IP) multicast is a bandwidth-conserving technology that reduces traffic by 
simultaneously delivering a single data stream to an arbitrary number o f  receivers that expresses 
an interest in receiving this particular data stream. These receivers do not have any physical or 
geographical boundaries -  they can be located anywhere on the Internet. Although multicast can 
be achieved by using multiple point-to-point messages (unicast approach), mechanisms that 
enable multi-destinations delivery using a single group address can provide greater efficiency as 
illustrated in Figure 2-1. First, multicast reduces the amount o f  bandwidth in the network required 
to transport the data streams to the receivers. Only one copy o f  the same data stream is needed 
over the same links with the network elements such as routers or switches replicate it as necessary 
for the receivers. Second, multicast saves processing power at the source and facilitates the fact 
that a service may scale to extremely large group size. The source only needs to generate a 
message once and distributes it to the link once. Third, a small o f  state information is needed for 
the source since it neither needs to know the number o f  subscribed receivers nor their identities.
(a) (b)
Figure 2-1: (a) Unicast and (b) Multicast
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To allow packets to be distributed in a scalable manner to extremely large group, IP multicast 
does not specify the individual IP addresses o f  all receivers, but instead uses a single group 
address to identify them. In practice, IP multicast packets are quite similar to unicast IP packets, 
except that the destination IP address is chosen in the range 224.0.0.0 to 239.255.255.255, which 
is also known as class D addresses in IPv4 (Refer to [42] for assignment restriction). Receivers 
that are interested in receiving packets from a certain multicast group “ subscribe”  to the 
corresponding group address and the multicast routing protocols take care o f  forwarding the 
packets to the receivers. T o  achieve this, multicast relies on two primary mechanisms: first, a 
membership discovery protocol which allows recipients to signify to a local multicast router in 
receiving the multicast traffic, and second, multicast routing protocols that create the distribution 
trees.
2.1.1 Membership discovery Protocol
The first step toward multicast communications is the identification o f  the receivers. A  receiver 
must signal to its local multicast router that it wishes to jo in  a specific multicast group. This is 
accomplished via the Internet Group Management Protocol (IGM P) [10 ][11] in IPv4, which takes 
place between the host and the multicast local router.
IGMP is used to automatically control and limit the flow  o f  multicast traffic through a network. 
IGMP manages multicast groups and traffic through the use o f  queiy and report messages. 
Routers periodically send out IGMP queiy messages to interfaces on their network to see i f  any 
group members exist. These messages are not forwarded on to other networks. I f  a receiver wants 
to join  a multicast group, it sends out an IGM P report message in response to the queiy and 
depending on the report that a router receives from  the interfaces on a network, it works out where 
to forward the multicast packets. I f  a router does not receive a response to its queiy messages after 
a number o f  queries, it assumes that there are no group members on that network. A  receiver does 
not need to wait for query before joining a multicast group, they can send out a message 
requesting to receive a multicast data stream. It is important to note that local multicast routers are 
not interested in the specific receivers that are requesting the multicast data streams, they are only 
interested in the interfaces in a network that want to receive multicast traffic because multicast 
traffic is sent to an entire subnet, not a single receiver.
2.1.2 Multicast Routing Protocols
Once a local multicast router knows the group membership o f  its directly connected hosts, it then 
can exchange information with other routers using multicast routing protocol, enabling it to jo in  
the multicast distribution tree. The multicast distribution trees are used to describe the path that
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the IP multicast traffic takes through the network. The two basic types o f  multicast distribution 
trees are:
i. Source-based trees: A  separate tree is built for each source that is sending data to a 
multicast group. Each tree is rooted at a router adjacent to the source, and sources send 
data directly to the root o f  the tree. It is also referred to as a shortest path tree (SPT) 
because this tree creates an optimal path between the source and the receivers. This 
guarantees the minimum amount o f  network latency for forwarding multicast data. This 
optimisation does com e with a price, though: The routers must maintain path information 
for each source.
Figure 2-2 shows an example o f  an SPT for group 224.1.1.1 rooted at the source and 
connecting two receivers. The special notation o f  (S,G) enumerates an SPT where S is the 
IP address o f  the source and G is the multicast group address. Using this notation, the 
SPT for the example in Figure 2-2 would be written as (192.1.1.1, 224.1.1.1).
Figure 2-2: Source distribution tree
ii. Shared trees: A  single tree is built for all sources that are sending to a multicast group. 
The tree is rooted at some selected node also known as the Rendezvous Point (RP). The 
protocol then uses a protocol-specific mechanism to transport the data from the source to 
the root o f  the tree. This approach has the advantage o f  requiring the minimum amount o f  
state in each router. However, under certain circumstances, the path between the source 
and receivers might not be the optimal path -  which might introduce some latency in data 
delivery.
Figure 2-3 shows a shared tree for group 224.2.2.2 with the root located at Router C. 
W hen using a shared tree, sources must send their traffic to the root for the traffic to reach 
all receivers. Because all sources in the multicast group use a com m on shared tree, a 
wildcard notation written (*,G) represents the tree. In this case, * means all sources, and 
G represents the multicast group.
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Notation: (*, G )
.4.4
S Source  
R R eceiver 
G Group
Figure 2-3: Shared distribution tree
Routing multicast traffic is more com plex than routing unicast or broadcast traffic because IP 
multicast uses a single address to identify a particular transmission session rather than a specific 
physical destination. In other words, the multicast router cannot base its forwarding decision on 
the destination address in the packet; alternative methods are needed so that the multicast traffic 
can reach all receivers. The basic principle o f  multicast routing is that multicast router must 
interact with each other to exchange infonnation about neighbouring routers.
Multicast routing protocols facilitate the exchange o f  information between routers and are 
responsible for constructing distribution trees and forwarding multicast packets. There are number 
o f  different routing protocols, but they generally follow  one o f  the two basic approaches.
i. Dense mode protocols'. Dense protocols are based on the assumption that there are a number 
o f  group members densely distributed across a network. These protocols deliver the 
multicast traffic using a push principle. In other words, these protocols periodically flood 
the network with multicast traffic to establish and maintain the distribution tree. Dense 
mode protocols are best suited to environments where there are a number o f  hosts that 
wishes to receive the same multicast data stream and the bandwidth to copy with the 
flooding o f  the network. Some examples o f  the dense mode protocols are Distance Vector 
Multicast Routing Protocol (D V M R P) [17] and Protocol Independent Multicast Dense 
M ode (PIM -D M ) [15] which employ only SPT to deliver (S,G) multicast traffic.
D V M R P uses “ flood  and prune”  mechanism where a router floods a multicast packet that it 
received out on all interfaces except the one that leads back to the source o f  the packet. To 
prevent unnecessary sending o f  multicast messages through the distribution tree, DVM RP 
uses pruning. A  D V M R P router sends prune message to its neighbours i f  it discovers that 
the network to which a host is attached has no members or all neighbours, except the next- 
hop neighbours connected to the source, have pruned the source and the group. DVM RP 
has its own unicast routing protocol, based on hop counts that determined which interfaces 
leads back to the source.
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Similar to D V M R P, PIM -D M  floods packets out to all routers in a network and then prunes 
routers that do not have members attached. However, PIM -D M  does not need to build or 
maintain its own separate multicast routing table; instead it can use the existing routing 
table content.
ii. Sparse mode protocols'. Sparse mode protocols are based on the assumption that the group 
members that want to receive the multicast data stream are sparsely distributed across a 
network and that bandwidth is not necessarily widely available. As the group members are 
spread sparsely throughout the network, flooding would waste bandwidth and cause 
performance problems. Sparse mode protocols therefore are more selective about how  they 
distribute the multicast data stream. These protocols deliver the multicast traffic using a pull 
principle. They start with an empty distribution tree and only add branches when they 
receive jo in  requests. Sparse mode protocols make use o f  shared trees and occasionally, as 
in the case o f  Protocol Independent Multicast Sparse M ode (PIM -SM ) [16], SPTs to 
distribute multicast traffic to the receivers in the network.
PIM -SM  uses a RP that senders direct their information to and receivers request information 
from. W hen a receiver wishes to receive a multicast data stream, it registers with the RP and 
once the data starts to flow  from sender, the rendezvous point sends the data on. The routers 
automatically optimise the path to get rid o f  unnecessary hops. A s PIM -SM  is protocol 
independent, it can use the existing unicast routing table content.
2.2 Security
Although the advantages o f  multicasting are clear, it also poses several unique security issues due 
to its open nature. First, it is not possible to restrict communication to a set o f  authorised members 
since anyone can request to receive the data and the sender has no control over the group 
membership. This complicates the billing process for the content providers as well. Second, 
anybody can send data to the multicast group and there are no mechanisms to restrict unauthorised 
sources from  sending data the multicast group. In such cases, the group members need to be able 
to verify that the messages received are from the intended source. Third, there is no 
individualisation o f  the received data as all members receive the same packets. Responding to 
these issues in multicast, the work has divided into several areas (Refer to Section 1.2).
Generally, the two basic security mechanisms to secure communication are:
• Confidentiality. The assurance that the content o f  a message is known only to its intended 
recipients. Confidentiality o f  messages is generally achieved through encryption.
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• Authentication: The assurance that the identity o f  the sender o f  a message can be proved 
to the recipient as correct.
2.2.1 Confidentiality
In unicast or multicast communication, the confidentiality o f  the data can be achieved by 
encryption. Encryption is any process that can convert readable data into secret code to prevent 
unauthorised members from reading the encrypted information. Unencrypted information is 
referred to as clear text, while enciypted data is called ciphertext. The reversal o f  encryption is 
called decryption. A n algorithm that implements encryption and decryption is also known as a 
cryptographic algorithm. A  key is used in conjunction with a cryptographic algorithm to either 
encrypt clear text and/or decrypt ciphertext. Figure 2-4 illustrates an example o f  converting clear 
text into ciphertext through encryption.
Figure 2-4: Converting clear text into ciphertext through encryption
Basically, there are two main approaches to encryption:
• Symmetric key encryption, which uses shared secrets between two or more parties.
• Asymmetric key encryption, which uses separate but related keys for encryption and 
deciyption; one public, the other private.
Hybrid systems mix symmetric and asymmetric cryptography to use the best features o f  both.
2.2.1.1 Symmetric key encryption
In symmetric key encryption, the sender and the receiver share a com m on secret key, which they 
use to secure communications between them as shown in Figure 2-5. The sender uses the secret 
key to encrypt the message before its transmission and the receiver the same secret key to decrypt 
the received message. Symmetric enciyption is generally very fast, uses short keys and can be 
implemented in hardware. It is most com m on encryption scheme for achieving bulk data 
enciyption.
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Figure 2-5: Symmetric key encryption
The two types o f  symmetric ciphers are as follows.
• Block ciphers. B lock ciphers break the input into contiguous and fixed-length blocks o f  
symbols and apply the same encryption rules to each plaintext block  to produce the 
corresponding ciphertext block.
• Stream ciphers. Stream ciphers convert the input stream o f  plaintext symbols into stream 
o f  ciphertext symbols. The encryption rule used on any plaintext symbol or group o f  
contiguous symbols depends on the relative position o f  that portion o f  the input from the 
beginning o f  the stream.
2.2.1.2 Asymmetric key encryption
Asymmetric key encryption, also known as public key cryptography, uses two different keys for 
achieving secrecy as shown in Figure 2-6. The keys are related to each other (hence they are 
called a key pair), but they are different. The relationship between the keys is such that message 
encrypt by KI can only be decrypted by its pair K2. I f K2 encrypts the information, it can only be 
decrypted by K I. In practice, one key is called the private key and other is called the public key. 
The private key is kept secret by the owner o f  the key pair. The public key is published with 
information as to who the owner is.
KI
Plaintext
algorithm algorithm
Figure 2-6: Asymmetric key encryption
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The pair o f  keys is generated together and therefore related. It is essential to note that despite 
having this relationship, that even having access or knowledge o f  the public key, it is infeasible to 
compute the value o f  the private key. Therefore, there is no threat to the system by publishing the 
public key.
Compared with symmetric key enciyption, asymmetric key enciyption induces high 
computationally overhead and is therefore not appropriate for large amounts o f  data. Asymmetric 
enciyption is mainly used for signatures, authentication, and key establishment.
2.2.2 Authentication
Message authentication provides two services. It provides a way to ensure message integrity and a 
way to verify who sent the message. Data integrity and message authentication go hand in hand. 
Suppose the multicast data has been m odified in transit, the source is no longer the legitimate 
origin o f  data. Similar, i f  the receiver can verify that the source o f  the data, it proves that the data 
has not been m odified en route. Non-repudiation is a strong form o f  authentication, which allows 
impartial third-party verification o f  the data source. The two methods to achieve authentication 
are Message Authentication Code (M A C ) and digital signatures.
2.2.2.1 Message Authentication Code (MAC)
A  message authentication code (M A C ) enciypts a message digest with a session key to provide 
assurance that the content o f  a message has not been modified in transit. A  hashing algorithm is 
first applied to the message to generate a hash, a short, fixed-length cryptographic string also 
called the message digest that uniquely represents the message. The sender then encrypts the hash 
using a session key, which is a shared secret key known to both sender and receiver. The resulting 
M A C  is then attached to the message and sent. When the message is received, the receiver 
deciypts the M A C  using the same session key to recover the hash. The recipient then hashes the 
original message and compares this to the received hash. I f  the two hashes match, the recipient 
knows that the message hash integrity and has not been m odified in transit. The process is 
illustrated in Figure 2-7.
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Figure 2-7: The MAC process
2.2.2.2 Digital Signature
Digital signature mechanisms are used to provide an electronic analogue form o f  handwritten 
signatures for electronic documents. Like handwritten signatures, digital signatures must not be 
forgeable; a receiver must be able to verify it and the signer must not be able to repudiate it later. 
But unlike handwritten signatures, digital signatures incorporate the data (or the hash o f  the data) 
that are signed. Different data therefore result in different signatures even i f  the signatory is 
unchanged.
To create a digital signature, the message to be transmitted is first mathematically hashed to 
produce a message digest. The hash is then encrypted using the sender’ s private key to form the 
digital signature, which is appended to or embedded within the message. Once the encrypted 
message is received, it is decrypted using the sender’ s public key. The recipient can then hash the 
original message and compare it with the hash included in the signature to verify the sender’ s 
identity.
private key 
used for signing
Figure 2-8: Digital signatures
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2.3 Discussion
Figure 2-9 illustrates the difference between an IP multicast group and a secure multicast group. 
At the core o f  a secure group model, there is cryptographic symmetric key, called the group key. 
A ll the data transmitted to the multicast group is encrypted by the sender using this group key and 
the group key is made available only to authorised receivers o f  the multicast group. Therefore, 
only authorised members, having the group key, can decrypt and access the data stream.
#  Members of secure multicast group
O  Members of IP multicast group
vrO  Group key
IP multicast group 
Secure multicast group
Figure 2-9: Secure multicast group
The receivers’ membership to the secure multicast group is defined by whether they have the 
shared group key. Therefore the management o f  the multicast group key is a critical factor for the 
security o f  the multicast group.
Establishment o f  a shared group key does not “ secure”  communication within the group. I f  data 
stream are encrypted with the group key, then confidentiality o f  the message is guaranteed. This 
alone does not prevent a legitimate group member from masquerading as another member. One 
way to achieve source authentication is to use digital signatures. However, it is important to note 
that digital signature is computationally expensive.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented the advantages o f  using multicasting. W e have also described 
how the receivers join  the multicast group and receive the multicast traffic from the distribution 
trees. As end users and application service providers require some form o f  security, we recall 
some o f  the mechanisms to provide confidentiality and authentication. Finally, we have explained 
the difference between an IP multicast group and a secure multicast group.
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C h a p t e r  3
3  M u l t i c a s t  S e c u r i t y
Multicast security motivated intensive academic and industrial research works due to the 
advantages of multicasting (i.e., better utilisation of network and sender resources). Dedicated 
research groups are created at the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) and Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF) to address the many issues related to standardising secure multicast. 
Specifically, the two groups are Group Security (GSEC) Research Group and Multicast Security 
(MSEC) Working Group.
Securing IP multicast group communication is a complex task that involves many aspects such as 
infrastructure security (i.e. secure routing protocol), edge security (i.e. secure admission control 
protocol). Consequently, a secure IP multicast protocol suite must have a number of functional 
areas that address different aspects of the solution. Furthermore, there exists no one-fit-all 
solution. Below are the design principles for the architecture [43]:
• This architecture is concerned with multicast security for large multicast groups. 
Although it can be used for smaller groups, it is not necessary the efficient means. Other 
architectures (e.g., Cliques architecture [44]) can be more efficient for small ad-hoc group 
communication where there is no trusted entity in the group.
• This architecture is “end to end” and does not require multicast routing protocols to 
participate in this architecture. Even though inappropriate routing may cause Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks to application layer groups conforming to this architecture, the 
routing protocol, however, cannot affect the authenticity or secrecy of group data or 
management packets. The multicast routing protocols could themselves use this 
architecture to protect their own multicast and group packets. However, this would be 
independent of any secure application layer group. More information on routing security 
infrastructure can be found in [45] [46] [47] [48][49].
• This architecture does not require IP multicast admission control protocols (e.g. Internet 
Group Management Protocol) (IGMP) [10][11], Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) 
[12] [13]) to be part of secure multicast groups. As such, a “join” or “depart” operation for 
a secure group is independent of a “join” or “depart” of an IP multicast group. For 
example, the process of joining a secure group requires being authenticated and
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authorised by a security device, while the process of joining an IP multicast group entails 
contacting a multicast-aware router. Admission control protocols could themselves use 
this architecture to protect their own multicast packets. However, this would be 
independent of any secure application layer group. More information on admission 
control security can be found in [50][51][52].
• This architecture does not explicitly describe how secure multicast groups deal with
Network Address Translation (NAT) [53]. Multicast routing protocols generally require 
the source and destination addresses and ports of an IP multicast packet to remain 
unchanged. This allows consistent multicast distribution trees to be created throughout the 
network. If NAT is used in a network, then the connectivity of senders and receivers may 
be adversely affected. This situation should be neither improved nor degraded as a result 
of deploying this architecture.
• This architecture does not require the use of reliable mechanisms, for either data or
management protocols. The use of reliable multicast routing techniques (e.g., Forward
Error Correction (FEC) [54]) enhances the availability of secure multicast groups. 
However, the authenticity or secrecy of group data or management packets is not affected 
by the omission of that capability from a deployment.
Based on the above requirements, a Reference Framework has been defined to standardise the 
multicast security efforts. This framework presents a set of functional building blocks that should 
be tackled for any secure multicast architecture with centralised or distributed design 
[43][55][56].
3.1 Reference Fram ework
The purpose of the Reference Framework is to address the fundamental problem of the managing 
the keying material. The term “keying material” refers to the cryptographic key belonging to a 
multicast group, the state associated with the keys and the other security parameters related to the 
keys. It tries to classify the problem areas, function elements and interfaces.
As shown in Figure 3-1, the Reference Framework is based on three broad functional areas. It 
incoiporates the main entities and functions relating to multicast security, and depicts the inter­
relations among them. It also expresses the complex multicast security from the perspective of 
architecture (centralised and distributed), multicast group types (1-to-iV and M-to-N), and classes 
of protocols (the exchanged messages) needed to secure multicast packets.
Even though this Reference Framework provides some general context around the functional 
areas, and the relationships between the functional areas, some issues might span into more than
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one functional area. In fact, the framework encourages the precise identification and formulation 
of issues that involve more than one functional area or those which are difficult to express in 
terms of a single functional area. An example of such a case is the expression of policies 
concerning group keys, which involves both the functional areas of group key management and 
multicast policies.
Distributed Design
1 -to-A/ : Only a single sender is allowed to transmit data to the group 
M-io-N : Many group members can transmit data to the group
Figure 3-1: Reference Framework
The Reference Framework [43][56] can be viewed horizontally and vertically. Horizontally, it 
displays both the entities and functions as singular boxes, expressing each of the three broad 
problem areas (i.e., multicast security policies, management of keying material and multicast data 
handling). Vertically, it expresses the basic architecture designs for solutions; namely, a 
centralised architecture and a distributed architecture. In short, a distributed design is a superset of 
the centralised design which involves more than one group controllers and policy servers. This 
helps to prevent a single point of failure and performance bottleneck in the centralised design.
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3.2 Elements of the Reference Fram ework
The Reference Framework in Figure 3-1 contains boxes and arrows. The boxes are the functional 
entities and the arrows are the interfaces between them. Standard protocols are needed for the 
interfaces, which support the multicast services between the functional entities. There are three 
sets of functional entities in both centralised and distributed designs:
i. Group Controller (GC): The GC represents both the physical entity and functions relating 
to the issuing and management of cryptographic keys used by a multicast group, and 
functions pertaining to group membership management, such as authentication and 
authorisation of candidate members. In a distributed architecture, several GC entities are 
involved in the key management related services in order to achieve scalability in the key 
management related services. In such case, each member of a multicast group may 
interact with one or more GC entities. Similarly, in a distributed architecture, a GC entity 
may interact with one or more Policy Servers, also arranged in a distributed architecture.
ii. Member (Sender and Receiver): The member of the group, defined for a particular 
instance of group communications. The sender is an entity that sends data to the multicast 
group. In a 1 -to-vV multicast group, only a single sender is allowed to transmit data to the 
group. In an M-to-N  multicast group, many (or even all in the case of N-to-N  multicast 
group) group members can transmit data to the group. Both sender and receiver must 
interact with the GC entity for the purpose of key management. This includes member 
authentication, obtaining of keying material in accordance with key management polices,, 
for the group, obtaining new keys during key updates, and obtaining other messages
related to the management of keying material and security parameters.
iii. Policy server: The policy server represents both the physical entity and functions used to 
create and manage security policies specific to a multicast group. The policy server 
interacts with the GC in order to install and manage the security policies related to the 
membership of a given multicast group. The interactions between the policy server and 
other entities in the Reference Framework are dependent to a large extent on the security 
circumstances being addressed by a given policy.
The need for solutions to be scalable to large groups across wide geographic regions of the 
Internet requires the elements of the framework to also function as a distributed system. This 
implies that a GC entity must be able to interact securely with other GC entities in a different 
location. Similarly, policy servers must interact with each other securely to allow the
communication and enforcement , of policies across the Internet.
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3.3 Problem areas
As mentioned previously, Figure 3-1 shows three horizontal labels denoting the classification of 
the problems into three problem areas, which can be seen as three sub-problems of the broader 
fundamental problem: secure multicast data handling, management o f keying material, and 
multicast security policies.
3.3.1 Problem area 1: Multicast data handling
This area covers problems concerning the security-related treatments. In a secure multicast group, 
the multicast data typically need to be:
• Encrypted using a group key, mainly for access control or confidentiality.
• Authenticated, for verifying the source and integrity of the data. Authentication takes two 
flavours:
o Source authentication: This functionality guarantees that the multicast data 
originated with the claimed source and was not modified en route (either by a 
group member or an external attacker).
o Group authentication: This type of authentication only guarantees that the data 
generated (or last modified) by some group members. It does not guarantee data 
integrity unless all group members are trusted.
This problem area addresses data transforms for multicast data secrecy and integrity protocol. For 
data secrecy, the sender needs to enciypt the data stream with a secret key which is known by all 
group members that are authorised to receive multicast data streams. When the group becomes 
large, scalable distribution and rekeying of a group key can be a complex problem.
IP Security (IPSec) Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) transform [57] for secrecy is applicable 
to private multicast communication as well. The only caveat is that the replay protection 
mechanism of ESP works only for single sender multicast communication. ESP also supports 
Message Authentication Code (MAC)-based integrity protection for unicast communication. In 
two party communications, MAC-based authentication is sufficient for a group member to 
determine whether a packet originated at the sender. For example, consider two communicating 
peers, Alice and Bob, who each hold a secret key for message authentication. Alice uses the key 
to compute a MAC (e.g., hash-based MAC (HMAC) [58]) of the message, and sends the message 
along with the MAC to Bob. Bob repeats the procedure to compute the MAC, and compares it 
with the received MAC. If the MACs are identical, Bob knows that the message has not been 
modified en route. He also knows that since he has not sent the message, Alice must have sent it, 
assuming the authentication key has not been compromised.
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Unfortunately, this is not the case in a multi-party communication. However, we can still use 
MACs for authenticating group communications following a similar procedure as above, but with 
a reduced level of integrity protection. Consider a group, consisting of Alice, Bob, and Cindy, 
holding an authentication key. Alice might use a MAC to authenticate a message sent to Bob and 
Cindy. Bob (or Cindy), however, does not know whether the message has been sent or last 
modified by Alice or Cindy (or Bob). In general, group members can verify only that non­
members (i.e. hosts who do not hold the group authentication key) have not changed the data in 
transit.
For multicast applications such as share-quote, it is often not sufficient to be able to verify that a 
message originated within the group. Receivers would like to establish, at least to themselves, the 
sender of multicast data. A stronger property is for any third party to be able to independently 
verify the sender of the data stream. This is known as non-repudiation.
Application requirements greatly influence the solution space for source authentication. First, an 
application may require non-repudiation or only source authentication. Next, data transmission 
may be reliable or lossy. Furthermore, the sender or receivers may have limited buffer space. 
Moreover, receivers could have limited computational power (e.g., mobile devices), and in some 
cases, the receivers’ computational capacity may be heterogeneous. Receivers may be at different 
distances from the sender. Finally, the application may involve bulk data transfer(s) or streaming. 
It is also important to note that multicast data encrypted and/or authenticated by a sender should 
be handled the same way by both centralised and distributed receivers.
3.3.2 Problem area 2: Management of keying material
This area is concerned with the security of distribution and refreshment of keying material. 
Hence, the management of the cryptographic keys belonging to a group necessarily requires the 
management of their associated state and parameters. A number of specific issues need to be 
addressed. These may include the following:
• Methods for member identification and authentication;
• Methods to verify the membership to multicast groups;
• Methods to establish a secure channel between a GC entity and the member, for the
purpose of delivery of shorter-term keying material pertaining to a multicast group;
• Methods to establish a long-term secure channel between one GC entity and another, for 
the purpose of distributing shorter-term keying material pertaining to a multicast group;
• Methods to effect the changing of keys and keying material;
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• Methods to detect and signal failures and perceived compromises to keys and keying 
material.
The requirement related to the management of keying material must be seen in the context of the 
policies that prevail within the given circumstance.
3.3.3 Problem area 3: Multicast security policies
This area covers aspects of policy in the context of multicast security, taking into consideration 
the fact that policies may be expressed in different ways, that they may exist at different levels in 
a given multicast security architecture and that they may be interpreted differently according to 
the context in which they are specified and implemented. Multicast security policies must provide 
the rules for operation for the other elements of the Reference Framework. Security policies may 
be distributed in an ad-hoc fashion in some instances. However, better coordination and higher 
levels of assurance are achieved if a Policy Controller distributes security policies to the group.
Policy creation for secure multicast has several more dimensions than the single administrator 
specified policy assumed in the existing unicast policy frameworks. Secure multicast groups are 
usually large and by their nature extend over several administrative domains, if not spanning a 
different domain for each member. In addition to representing the security mechanisms for the 
group communication, the policy must also represent the rules for the governance of the secure 
group. For example, policy would specify the authorisation level necessary in order for an entity 
to join a group. More advanced operations would include the conditions when a group member 
must be forcibly removed from the group, and what to do if the group members need to 
resynchronise because of lost key management messages.
3.4 Group Security Association (GSA)
In the context of unicast, the two-party Security Association (SA) management model is used to 
secure the communication between both parties. An SA is defined to be simplex in the Internet 
Protocol Security (IPSec) Architecture [59] and is identified by a Security Parameter Index (SPI) 
[59][60]. SAs are established according to local policy [59][61] using exchanges that are designed 
to protect against basic key establishment attacks, such as man-in-the-middle, connection 
hijacking, replay/reflection, and denial-of-service (DoS) [62]. The first three types of attacks can 
be combated by mechanisms such as “direct authentication”, which integrated authentication into 
the key exchange, as described in the Station-to-Station (StS) protocol [63][64][65] and protection 
against the denial-of-service attack uses a pair-wise cookie mechanism [60] between peer entities, 
which are used in the Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) 
header for all exchanges [62] [66].
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However, the unicast SA negotiation model in ISAKMP/Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [62] [66] is 
simply not mappable to groups in the case of IP multicast, and the wider field of group 
communications, as there are many group members (senders and receivers). Furthermore, a group 
negotiation procedure for SA parameters would simply be impractical and resource consuming for 
many multicast applications [67]. Some changes have been proposed on current IPsec transform 
[57][68] to make them suitable for IP multicast traffic [69][70] such as combining SPI with 
destination address to identify multicast SA. However, neither the existing nor proposed 
semantics are sufficiently general such that IPsec can be used to protect the wide variety of IPv4 
and IPv6 multicast applications that are expected by the IP multicast community [71].
In the same way that a unicast SA maintains state or supporting information pertaining to keys, 
their modes of usage, policies and other parameters, a coherent group key management protocol 
requires state to be maintained by each concerned member in the group regarding the key material 
used by the group. This collection of information and parameters is called the Group Security 
Association (GSA) pertaining to the multicast group [72].
A GSA contains all of the SA attributes in point-to-point key management (i.e. attributes include 
cryptographic keys, algorithm, identifier and other related attributes used to associate with the 
security material), as well as some additional attributes pertaining to the group. As shown in 
Figure 3-2, the GSA is built on the SA in two distinct ways.
• First, the GSA is a superset of an SA (Figure 3-2(a)). A GSA has group policy attributes. 
For example, the kind of signed credentials needed for group membership, whether group 
members will be given new keys when a member is added, or whether group members 
will be given new keys when a member is removed from the group. A GSA also includes 
an SA as an attribute of itself.
• Second, the GSA is an aggregation of SAs (Figure 3-2(b)). A GSA is comprised of 
multiple SAs, and these SAs may be used for several independent purposes.
GSA
SA
GSA
SA1 SA2
SA3
(a) superset (b) aggregation
Figure 3-2: Relationship of GSA to SA
The GSA has been defined to be an aggregate of three categories or types of SAs [73][74]. There 
is a “pull” SA between the group member and the GC, a “push” SA between the GC and all the
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group members, and an SA to protect application data from the sender-members to receiver- 
members. In fact, each sender to the group may use a unique key for their data and use a separate 
SA. These three categories of SAs, which correspond to three different kinds of communications 
commonly required for group communications, are shown in Figure 3-3.
• Categoiy 1 SA (Registration SA):
An SA is required for (bi-directional) unicast communications between the GC and a 
group member (be it a sender or receiver). This SA is established only between the GC 
and a member. The GC entity is charged with access control to the group keys, with 
policy distribution to members (or prospective members), and with group key 
dissemination to member-sender and member-receiver.
This Registration SA is initiated by the member to pull the GSA information from the 
GC. This is how the member requests to join the secure group, or has its GSA keys re­
initialised after being disconnected from the group. The GSA information pulled down 
from the GC includes the SA, keys and policy used to secure the data transmission 
between sending and receiving members. This SA is used to protect the other elements of 
the GSA (such as the other following two categories of SAs), either in a “push” or “pull” 
model. As such, this SA is crucial and is inseparable from the other two SAs as the 
definition of a GSA.
However, the requirement of a registration SA does not imply the need of a registration 
protocol to create that Registration SA. The Registration SA could instead be setup 
through some manual means, such as distributed on a smart card. Thus, what is important 
is that a Registration SA exists, and is used to protect the other SAs.
• Category 2 SA (Rekey SA):
An SA is required for the multicast transmission of rekey messages (uni-directional) from 
the GC to all group members. As such, this SA is known by the GC and all members of 
the group. Rekey messages may result from group membership changes, from changes in 
group security policy, from the creation of new traffic-protection keys (TPK) for the 
particular group, or from key expiration. The term TPK is used to denote the combination 
of a shared group key and a traffic integrity key, or the key material used to generate 
them. The GC must ensure that all members receive the rekey information in a timely 
manner. In addition, the member should contact and resynchronise with the GC if their 
keys expired or an updated key has not been received.
This SA is not negotiated, since all the group members must share it. Thus, the GC must 
be authentic source and act as the sole point of contact for the group members to obtain
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this SA. In some cases, this rekey SA is not absolutely required to be part of a GSA. For 
example, the lifetime of some groups may be short enough such that a rekey is not 
necessary.
• Category 3 SA (Data Security SA):
The Data Security SA protects data between member-senders and member-receivers. One 
or more SAs are required for the multicast transmission of data messages (unidirectional) 
from the sender to other group members. This SA is known by the GC and by all 
members of the group. Similarly, regardless of the number of instances of this Data 
Security SA, this SA is not negotiated. Rather, all group members obtain it from the GC. 
The GC itself does not use this categoiy of SA. If the group has more than one Data 
Security SA, the data security protocol must have a means of differentiating the SAs (e.g. 
with a SPI). There are a number of possibilities with respect to the number of the Data 
Security SAs:
i. Each member-sender in the group could be assigned a unique Data Security SA, 
thereby resulting in each member-receiver having to maintain as many Data 
Security SAs as there are member-senders in the group. In this case, each source 
may be verified using source origin authentication techniques.
ii. The entire group deploys a single Data Security SA for all member-senders. 
Member-receiver would then be able to maintain only one data security SA.
iii. A combination of 1 and 2.
Category 3 SA 
Figure 3-3: GSA definition
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3.5 Sum m ary
In this chapter, we have discussed the design principles of a multicast architecture. Based on these 
requirements, a Reference Framework has been defined to address the fundamental problem in 
multicast security. This framework is based on three broad problem areas. It also incorporates the 
main entities and functions related to multicast security.
The three functional elements are Group Controller (GC), member (Sender and Receiver) and 
policy server. The GC represents the physical entity and functions related to the issuance and 
management of cryptographic keys used by a multicast group, and functions pertaining to group 
membership management such as authentication and authorisation of candidate members. The 
member could be a sender, receiver or both. Both sender and receiver must interact with the GC 
entity for the purpose of key management. Finally, the policy sever represents the physical entity 
and functions used to create and manage security policies specific to a multicast group.
The three problem areas are secure multicast data handling, management of keying material, and 
multicast security policies. The multicast data handling area covers the problems concerning the 
security-related treatments. In a secure multicast group, the multicast data typically need to be 
encrypted for access control or authenticated in order for the receiver to verify the source and 
integrity of the data. The management of key material area is concerned with the security of 
distribution and refreshment of the keying material. Finally, the multicast security policies area 
covers aspects of policy in the context of multicast security and it must provide the rules for 
operation for the other elements of the Reference Framework.
A GSA has been defined as the unicast Security Association (SA) model is simply not mappable 
to group and the wider field of group communications, as there are many group members (senders 
and receivers). Furthermore, a group negotiation for SA parameters would be impractical and 
resource consuming for many multicast applications. A GSA is an aggregate of three categories or 
types of SAs. There is a “pull” SA between the group member and the GC, a “push” SA between 
the GC and all the groups, and an SA to protect application data from the sender-members to 
receiver-members.
In the subsequent chapters, we will be concentrating on one problem area in the Reference 
Framework -  management of keying material.
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C h a p t e r  4
4  G r o u p  K e y  M a n a g e m e n t
Group key management is the field of study of the management of cryptographic keying material 
(i.e., cryptographic keys) for secure groups [75][76]. A secure group is a collection of members, 
who may be senders, receivers, or both receivers and senders to other members of the group. The 
aim of group key management is generally to provide common symmetric keys or group keys to 
all members of the group so that only authorised members can gain access to the multicast data 
stream. This group key is often referred to as Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) that is used to 
encrypt the data stream being transmitted to the group from one or more senders. Auxiliary keys, 
also referred to as Key Encryption Keys (KEKs), are used to provide scalable rekeying. The 
operation for updating the group key is known as rekeying. The handling of these keys (i.e., TEK 
and KEKs) is usually complex because it has to operate in a veiy dynamic environment.
Some applications achieve simpler operation by running key management over a pre-established 
secure channel (e.g., IP Security (IPsec) [59] or Transport Layer Security (TLS) [77]). Other 
security protocols benefit from key management protocol that can mn over an already-deployed 
session initiation of management protocol (e.g., Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [78] or Real 
Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP) [79]). Finally, some benefit from a lightweight key management 
protocol that requires few round trips. For all these reasons, application-, transport-, and IP-layer 
data security protocols (e.g., IPsec [59] and Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) [80]) 
benefit from different group key management systems.
Before proceed, we introduce some notation and definitions used in this chapter.
N Total number of group members
L Number of departing members
J Number of joining members
k Outdegree of key tree
h Maximum height of the key tree
M Total number of DGs
I Total number of SGs
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Data Group m
Service Group i
< Data group key of Dm
Kf Data group key of S-t
r Random number
s Seed value
g One-way function
P Pseudorandom function
f Mixing function
n Length of UID
w Node ID
4.1 Multicast Security (M S E C ) Group K ey M anagem ent Architecture
A common architecture for group key management, referred to as Multicast Security (MSEC) 
group key management architecture, has been defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) [81], It describes the key management protocols that help to establish a Group Security 
Association (GSA).
4.1.1 Requirements of a Group Key Management Protocol
A group key management protocol supports protected communication between members of a 
secure group. As group membership may vary over time, a group key management protocol must 
ensure that only members of a secure group can gain access to group data (by gaining access to 
group keys) and authenticate group data. The goal of a group key management protocol is to 
provide legitimate group members with the up-to-date cryptographic state they need for secrecy 
and authentication.
Multicast applications such as multicast video streaming and multicast file transfer have the 
following key-management requirements [40][81]:
i. Group members receive Security Associations (SAs) which including encryption keys, 
authentication/integrity keys, cryptographic policy that describes the keys, and attributes 
such as an index for referencing the SA or particular objects contained in the SA.
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ii. In addition to the policy associated with group keys, the Group Controller (GC) may 
define and enforce group membership, key management, data security, and other policies 
that may or may not be communicated to the entire membership.
iii. Keys will have a predetermined lifetime and may be periodically refreshed.
iv. Key materials should be delivered securely to members of the group so that they are 
secret, integrity-protected, and verifiably obtained from an authorised source.
v. The key management protocol should be secure against replay attacks and Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks.
vi. The protocol should facilitate addition and removal of group members. Members who are 
added may optionally be denied access to the key material used before they joined the 
group, and removed members should lose access to the key material following their 
departure.
vii. The protocol should support a scalable group rekeying operation without unicast 
exchanges between members and a GC, to avoid overwhelming a GC managing a large 
group.
viii.The protocol should be compatible with the infrastructure and performance needs of the 
data-security application, including IPSec security protocols, Encapsulating Security 
Protocol (ESP) [57] and Authentication Header (AH) [82], and/or application-layer 
security protocols such as SRTP [80].
ix. The key management protocol should offer a framework for replacing or renewing 
security transforms, authorisation infrastructure and authentication systems.
x. The key management protocol should be secure against collusions among excluded 
members and non-members. Specifically, collusions must not result in attackers gaining 
any additional group secrets that each of them individually are privy to. In other words, 
combining the knowledge of the colluding entities must not result in revealing additional 
group secrets.
xi. The key management protocol should provide a mechanism to securely recover from a 
compromise of some or all of the key material.
xii. The key management protocol may need to address real-world deployment issues such as 
Network Address Translation (NAT)-traversal and interfacing with legacy authentication 
mechanisms.
These requirements list however is not intended to be an exhaustive list nor applicable to all 
applications so an adaptive approach should be adopted when incorporate requirement in design.
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4.1.2 Design of M SEC Group Key Management Architecture
As mentioned above, the main goal of a group key management protocol is to securely provide 
group members with an up-to-date SA, which contains the needed information for securing group 
communication (i.e., the group data). This SA is known as the Data SA. In order to achieve this 
goal, the MSEC group key management architecture defines the following protocols.
i. Registration Protocol
In this protocol, the GC and a joining member mutually authenticate each other. If the 
authentication succeeds and the GC finds that the joining member is authorised, then the 
GC supplies the joining member with the following information:
• Sufficient information to initialise the Data SA within the joining member. This 
information is given only if the group security policy calls for initialising the Data 
SA at registration.
• Sufficient information to initialise a Rekey SA within the joining member. This 
information is given if the group security policy calls for a rekey protocol.
Some registration protocols need to tunnel through a data-signalling protocol to take 
advantage of existing security functionality, and/or to optimise the total session setup 
time. It may be advantageous to tunnel the key exchange procedure inside call 
establishment [83] [84] so that both can complete at the same time.
The registration protocol must ensure that the transfer of information from GC to member 
is done in an authenticated and confidential manner over a registration SA. A 
complementary de-registration protocol serves to explicitly remove Registration SA state.
ii. Rekey Protocol
The group rekey protocol is for transport of keys and SAs between a GC and the members 
of a secure group. The GC may periodically update or change the Data SA, by sending 
rekey information to the group members. Rekey messages may result from group 
membership changes from:
• changes in group security policy,
• creation of new TEK and KEKs for the particular group,
• key expiration.
Generally, the goals of the rekey protocol are:
• to synchronise a GSA,
35
Chapter 4. Group Key Management
• to provide privacy and (symmetric and asymmetric) authentication, replay 
protection and DoS protection,
• efficient rekeying after changes in group membership or when keys (KEKs or 
TEKs) expire,
• reliable delivery of rekey messages,
• member recovery from an out-of-sync GSA,
• support multicast or multi-unicast.
Rekey messages are protected by the Rekey SA, which is initialised in the registration 
protocol. They contain information for updating the Rekey SA and/or the Data SA and 
can be sent via multicast to the group members or via unicast from the GC to a particular 
group member. There are two methods to authenticate the rekey messages: group-based 
and source authentication.
The rekey protocol ensures that all members receive the rekey information in a timely 
manner. In addition, the rekey protocol specifies mechanisms for the parties to contact the 
GC and re-synch if their keys expired and an updated key has not been received. The 
rekey protocol for large-scale groups offers mechanism to avoid implosion problems and 
to ensure reliability in its delivery of keying material.
Although the Rekey SA is established by the registration protocol, it is updated using a 
rekey protocol. When a member departs the group, it destroys its local copy of the GSA. 
Using a de-registration message may be an efficient way for a member to inform the GC 
that it has destroyed, or is about to destroy, the SAs. Such a message may prompt the GC 
to cryptographically remove the member from the group (i.e., to prevent the member from 
having access to future group communication). In large-scale multicast applications, 
however, de-registration can potentially cause implosion at the GC.
iii. Data Security Protocol
The data security protocol uses TEKs to protect data streams sent and received by the data 
security protocol. Thus the registration protocol and/or the rekey protocol establish the 
KEKs and TEKs. Regardless of the data security protocol used, the GC is responsible for 
supplying the TEKs, 01* information to derive the TEKs for traffic protection.
Figure 4-1 depicts the design of a group key management protocol. Each group member, sender or 
receiver, uses the registration protocol to get authorised and authenticated access to a particular 
group, its policies, and its keys. The two types of key used are the KEKs and TEKs. For group 
authentication of rekey or data, key integrity or traffic integrity keys may be used, as well. The
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KEK may be a single key that protect the rekey message, typically containing a new Rekey SA 
(containing a KEK) and/or Data SA (containing a TEK).
Figure 4-1: Design of a group key management model
There are a few distinct outcomes to a successful registration protocol exchange
• If the GC uses rekey messages, then the admitted member receives the Rekey SA. The 
Rekey SA contains the group’s rekey policy, and at least one group KEK. In addition, the 
GC sends a group integrity key for integrity protection of rekey messages. If a group key 
management algorithm is used for efficient rekeying, the GC also sends one or more 
KEKs as specified by the key distribution policy of the group key management.
• If rekey messages are not used for the group, then the admitted member receives TEKs 
(as part of the Data Security SAs) that are passed to the member’s data security protocol.
• The GC may pass the KEKs or TEKs to the member even if rekey messages are used, for 
efficiency reasons and according to group policy.
It is also important to note that the rekey protocol is primarily responsible for scalability of the 
group key management architecture. Hence, it is imperative that the above listed properties are 
provided in a scalable manner. For instance, the rekey properties may use a scalable group key 
management algorithm to reduce the number of keys sent in a rekey message.
4.2 Evaluation Criteria for K ey M anagem ent Solutions
A list of criteria for examining and comparing key management solutions has been presented in 
[40] [85][86]. Each criterion is listed and briefly explained.
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i. System architecture: A n ideal system might degrade gracefully in the face o f  network 
and system failures, but should not fail entirely. Various hierarchical and distributed 
architectures can provide this level o f  availability; centralised solutions cannot.
ii. Recovery from failure: A  well-designed system should not only withstand various node 
and network failures, but also recover from most system failures without having to re­
initialise the entire group.
iii. Scalability: The solution should scale to handle veiy large, w idely distributed groups. It 
should also be capable o f  handling very frequent key updates, to accommodate group 
with highly dynamic membership.
iv. Backward and Forward secrecy: In group communication, backward secrecy ensures 
that new group members cannot read past messages, and forward secrecy ensures that 
past group members cannot read current or future message. Some solutions improve key 
update efficiency by not perform rekeying eveiy time there is a change in the group 
membership. There are some applications in which this behaviour is acceptable, but in 
general it is desirable to guarantee both jo in  and depart secrecy.
v. Number of keys stored by GC and each member: In addition to the group key (TEK), 
auxiliary keys may be used to provide scalable rekeying. Therefore, the key storage for 
the GC and each member should be minimised.
vi. Number of messages to update on a join event: In order to provide backward secrecy, the 
GC needs to rekey the group eveiy time a member joins. Rekeying a jo in  event can be 
achieved by encrypting the old key with a new key.
vii. Number of messages to update on a depart event: In order to provide forward secrecy, 
the GC needs to rekey the group eveiy time a member departs. Since it is harder to rekey 
for a depart event compared to a jo in  event, some solutions does not perform rekeying 
eveiy time a member departs to improve the key update efficiency.
viii. Processing time for key management: Some solutions require 0(N) processing power to
rekey the group. Alternative solutions may achieve better cryptographic processing 
performance, at the cost o f  a more com plex key management structure.
ix. Protection against collusion: There are some key management solutions that sacrifice 
strength against collusions in favour o f  more efficient key management. In general, it is 
desirable to ensure that collusion among an arbitrary number o f  non-members cannot 
occur.
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x. Reliability requirements: Current IP multicast transport is based on User Datagram 
Protocol (UDP) [87] which means that the data delivery is unreliable, therefore systems 
that use multicast to distribute keys must em ploy a reliable multicast sub-system.
xi. Dependence on routing protocols: It is most desirable for a multicast security 
infrastructure to remain completely independent o f  underlying multicast routing 
protocols.
xii. Application-specific constraints'. M ost o f  the work focuses on general purpose secure 
multicast solutions; however, it is important to note that there are many applications for 
which general purpose solution are unnecessary and inefficient.
In our work, w e concentrate on (iii) to (ix) and (xi). Generally, our proposed schemes are 
independent o f  underlying multicast routing protocols and they do not suffer from collusions. In 
addition, our schemes scale in such a way that the rekeying cost increases with the logarithm o f  
the group size for a jo in  and depart request. The performance metrics we used to compare with 
existing work are (v) to (vii). However, we assume that the key distribution used in our proposed 
algorithms is reliable for (x). In other words, our algorithms can adopt any reliable mechanisms 
[88][89][90][91] to achieve the required reliability.
4.3 Centralised Design
In a centralised design, there is only one GC responsible for managing the group. Depending on 
the multicast security policies, the GC might need to spawn a rekey operation every time 
whenever there is a change in group membership in order to provide forward and backward 
secrecy. For some applications such as pay-per-view, it is possible to relax forward and backward 
secrecy requirement to obtain a better rekeying performance.
Figure 4-2 illustrates individual, batch and periodic rekeying. In individual rekeying, the GC 
spawns a rekeying instance each time the group membership changes. In batch rekeying, the GC 
rekeys after a few  group membership changes. For example in Figure 4-2(b), the GC performs a 
rekeying operation after 4 membership changes (i.e., jo in  or depart event). Finally, the GC may 
rekey every t time interval, irrespective o f  membership dynamics as shown in Figure 4-2(c). W e 
refer to this final type o f  rekeying as periodic rekeying.
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Figure 4-2: (a) Individual, (b) Batch and (c) Periodic rekeying
4.3.1 Single Group Key Management Algorithms using Individual Rekeying
In this section, we look at some o f  the group key management algorithms that have been proposed 
in literature for a single data stream. Generally, we focus on individual rekeying where the GC 
performs a rekeying operation every time a member joins or departs the group.
4.3.1.1 Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP)
The Group K ey Management Protocol (G K M P) [75] [76] enables the creation and maintenance o f  
a group key. In this approach, the GC helps the first member to jo in  the group by creating a Group 
K ey Packet (GKP) that contains the KEK and TEK. When a new member wants to jo in  the group, 
the GC sends it a copy o f  the GKP. W hen a rekey is needed, the GC generates a new GKP and 
encrypts it with the current KEK. A s all members know the KEK, there is no solution for keeping 
forward secrecy when a member departs the group except to re-create an entirely new group 
without that member. Clearly, such a scheme has computational and communication complexity 
that is linear to the group size, which is inefficient.
4.3.1.2 Multicast key management with Arbitrarily Revealed Key 
Sequences
Multicast key management with arbitrarily revealed key sequences (M A R K S) [92] is a 
mechanism for key distribution to a group, where the GC rekeys at fixed instances throughout the 
whole multicast session. There are two requirements:
The GC must know the duration o f the multicast session.
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• The departure time for each member must be known at time o f  join.
First, the GC divides the duration o f  the multicast session into t time periods and associates a 
group key with each time period. In other words, there are t group keys altogether. For example in 
Figure 4-3, the duration o f  the multicast session is 8 time periods, thus the group keys are from 
KO to K7.
In order to facilitate efficient distribution o f  group keys to members, M A RK S uses hierarchy o f  
seeds. The GC first randomly generates an initial seed value. Then it decides on the maximum 
tree height, h, which will lead to the total duration o f  the multicast session. The intermediate seed 
values at the first level, which correspond to the root’ s children, are computed using two different 
one-way functions [93], gL and gR. A  function g is a one-way function if  it is easy to compute 
g (x )  given x. However, i f  given y, it is computationally infeasible to find an jc such that 
y =  &(•*) • In other words, one can compute the seed o f  all descendant nodes but it is hard to 
compute its parent seed. This process is repeated until the height o f  the key tree is h.
Figure 4-3 depicts the seed generation mechanism. The GC first generates the root seed s00 and 
uses gL and gR to compute sx 0 and s , , ,  which correspond to the left and right children o f  the
root. It continues this process until the height o f  the tree is h, which is 3 in this case. Suppose 
member U1 is authorised to receive multicast data stream for 4 time periods as shown in Figure 
4-3, the GC just sends three seeds, s2, ,  s2, and s3 4 , to member U l. Member U1 can obtain s3,
and s3 3 by performing the necessary computation on s2].
Since all key distribution takes place during the member registration, all keys can be transported 
using unicast, thus it is easy to ensure reliable delivery. However, the disadvantage is that a 
member cannot be eliminated without rekeying the entire group.
Level 0 (root)
Level 1 
Level 2 
Level 3
KO K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 K7
h Member U1’s_________  isubscription
Figure 4-3: key distribution in MARKS
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4.3.1.3 Logical Key Tree (LKT)/Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH)
In the logical key tree approach [94][95][96], the GC maintains a tree o f  keys, where the internal 
nodes o f  the key tree hold KEKs and the leaf nodes correspond to group members. Each leaf node 
holds an individual key associated with that one member. Each group member receives and 
maintains a copy o f  the individual key associated with its leaf node and the KEKs corresponding 
to each ancestor node in the path from its parent node to the root. A ll group members share the 
group key held by the root o f  the key tree, which is also referred to as TEK, as shown in Figure 
4-4.
KO
Level 0
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Figure 4-4: Balanced binary key tree with 8 group members
W e use the term outdegree to refer to the number o f  child nodes each parent has. For a balanced 
key tree with outdegree, k, each member needs to store all the keys from its location to the root 
(i.e. 1 + log^ N  keys) and the GC needs to store all the keys in the key tree (i.e. (kN -1) /(k - 1)),
where N is the number o f  group members. For example, in Figure 4-4, member U1 knows KO, 
K I, K3, and K7. In this example, KO is the TEK, which is used to encrypt the multicast data 
stream, key nodes at level 1 and 2 (K I to K6) are the KEKs for rekeying purposes and key nodes 
at level 3 (K7 to K14) are the individual keys associated with the group members on the leaf 
nodes.
When a member is removed from the multicast group, the GC must change all the keys in the path 
from this member’ s leaf node to the root to achieve forward secrecy. A ll group members that 
remain in the group must update their keys accordingly, namely change the keys in the 
intersection between the path from their leaf nodes to the root and the path from the removed 
member’ s leaf node to the root. In particular, this means that every remaining member will learn 
the new TEK. The rekeying cost is k log^ (N) - 1  keys when the binary key tree is balanced. For 
example, in Figure 4-5, suppose member U8 is departing from the multicast group, all the keys he 
stores (KO, K2, and K6), except his individual key, must be changed. Let x ' denotes the new
42
Chapter 4. Group Key Management
version o f  key x, and {y }A. denotes the key y encrypted by key x. The rekey messages that need to 
be multicast to the members are:
• {K 6 '}k13 for member U7;
• {K 2 '}K5 for members U5 and U6;
• {K 2 '}K6, for member U7;
• {K 0 '}k1 for members U I to U4;
• {KO '}K2, for members U5 to U7.
I f  backward secrecy is required, then a jo in  operation is similar to a remove operation in which 
the keys that the joining member receives must be different from the keys previously used in the
multicast group. Suppose member U8 in Figure 4-5 is joining, the rekeying cost is 21ogA N when
the binary key tree is balanced. The GC multicast the follow ing rekey messages to the members.
• {K 6 '}K6 for member U7;
• {K 2,} K2 for members U4 to U7;
• {KO'}ko for members U I to U7;
• {K 6 '}k14 , {K 2 '}k14 , and {K 0 '}k14 for member U8.
KO
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4.3.1.4 Logical Key Hierarchy with improved join rekey complexity
To improve the rekey com plexity for a jo in  event, Versakey has been proposed in [97], In this 
scheme, the GC does not need to transmit any keys to the existing members. It just needs to notify 
the respective members o f  the key update. The members generate the replacement node keys by 
applying a one-way function to the keys they are replacing. Thus, rekeying cost for a jo in  event 
requires encryption and transmission o f  only log 2 N keys. For example, in Figure 4-5, when U8 
joins, the GC just need to inform the existing members that KO, K2 and K6 need to be changed. In 
addition, the GC needs to multicast {K 6 '}k14 , {K 2 '}k14 , and {K 0 '}k14 for member U8.
4.3.1.5 Logical Key Hierarchy plus (LKH+)
Logical K ey Hierarchy plus (LKH +) [40] has been proposed to improve the departing rekeying 
com plexity for a binary key tree using cryptographic techniques. The GC first generates a random 
value r with length equivalent to the desired key size and distributes it to the sibling o f  the 
departing member. W ith r, the sibling o f  the departing member can compute the key o f  its parent 
node using a pseudorandom function [93], P, which doubles the size o f  its input. The left part o f  
the output, P(r)\L, becom es the key o f  its parent node and right part o f  the output, P(r)\R, is used 
to generate keys on the path from its parent node to the root using the same process.
For clarity, we illustrate it with an example. For example, in Figure 4-5, U8 wishes to depart from 
the multicast group, the GC needs to change three keys, KO, K2, and K6. The GC first generates a 
random value, rK6, with length equivalent to the desire key size and distribute it to member U7. It
then applies pseudorandom function P(rK6), which doubles the size o f  its input, to generate
P (rK6)| L (becom e K6) and P(rK6)j R (becom e rK2). It repeats this process until it gets the seed,
rK0, to generate the new group key, TEK. The key distribution is as follow s:
• rK6 encrypted with K13 for member U7;
• rK2 encrypted with K5 for member U5 and U6;
• rK0 encrypted with K l for member U1 to U4.
Given the above seeds, all group members can compute the new TEK. In all, the GC sends only 
half as many encrypted keys compared to LKH. The only tradeoff compared to LKH is that the 
group members are responsible for computing the node keys.
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4.3.1.6 One-way Function Tree (OFT)
One-way Function Tree (OFT) [98] [99] has also been proposed to improve the depart complexity 
in binary key tree. The difference is the GC does not send the secret keys to the members. Instead, 
it supplies other keys that the members use to compute their ancestors’ keys, including the group 
key. A  one-way function g is used to compute a blinded key corresponding to each KEK in the 
key tree. Each internal node key is computed by applying a mixing function/ (e.g. X O R  function) 
to the blinded keys o f  its child node keys.
ki =  f ( g ( k!eMi)) ’ g iK ig h 'O )  ))
(4.1)
where left(j) and right(i) denote the left and right children o f  node i respectively. The function g is 
one-way function, a n d /is  a mixing function.
In this approach, a member not only holds its KEK but the blinded KEKs o f  the sibling nodes o f  
the nodes in its path to the root. For example, Figure 4-6, member U4 not only needs to store KO, 
K I, K4, K10, but the blinded key o f  K2 (g(K 2)), K3 (g(K 3)), and K9 (g(K 9)) as well. Applying 
this information to the Equation (4.1), a member is able to generate all the required KEKs.
KO
Keys that U4 needs 
to store
Blinded keys that 
U4 needs to store
Figure 4-6: Key storage in OFT
Figure 4-7 shows an example where U3 departs the group. This forces KO, K I, and K4 to be 
changed. The GC needs to multicast the follow ing rekey messages to the members.
• te(K 9')}K10
• { * (  K 4 ’) } K3
• te (K  l U a
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After receiving the rekey messages, the new KEKs can be calculated by every group member: 
K4' = /(g(K9'),g(K10)), K l’ = /(g(K3),g(K4’)), and KO' = / (g(Kl'),g(K2)).
KO'
4.3.1.7 Optimal key storage Logical Key Hierarchy
In order to reduce the number of keys the GC has to store, an optimal key storage LKH scheme 
[100] has been proposed. This technique reduces the key storage requirement of the GC by 
constructing the keys in tree nodes by means of pseudorandom function only known by the GC. 
Thus the keys in node (/, j) are generated according to the following expression:
K{iJ)=P(2i+ j ) ® r
(4.2)
where P denote a pseudo-random function and r is another random number needed for updating 
the key. The symbol © is the XOR function.
K-i.1
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During rekeying, the GC does not send the updated key themselves but the required information 
that single member needs in order to update them. In other words, the GC sends the group key and 
the following parameter to the members:
Q = r®r'
(4.3)
The method used to distribute the group key and the parameter Q to the members is similar to 
LKH (bottom-up method). Therefore the number of rekey message is 0(\ogk N). Using Q, each 
single member only has to compute the following equation to update his keys:
K ' ^ ^ K ^ Q - P V l  + j ^ r '  (44)
4.3.1.8 Discussion
In this section, we summarise and compare the algorithms that have been discussed in the 
previous section. We use some of the criteria which we discussed in Section 4.2 for evaluation.
Table 1 identifies the secrecy (i.e. backward and forward), rekeying costs (i.e. join and depart 
request) and key storage needed by the GC and each member. Among all the algorithms, only 
MARKS does not require rekeying for a join or depart event, this is because the GC distributes all 
the keys each member needs for the whole of its subscription when the member joins the group. 
Thus, the key storage needed by the GC and each member is dependent on the multicast session 
and member’s subscription respectively. Due to this, MARKS is not suitable for cases where 
departure time of each member is unknown when it joins the group and a member cannot be 
eliminated during its subscription without rekeying the entire group. As for the rest of the 
algorithms, other than GKMP, the rekeying costs scale linearly with logarithm of the group size 
for a join or depart event. Versakey, LKH+, OFT achieve better rekeying costs compared to LKH 
at the expenses of increased computation at the member side. Furthermore, OFT requires each 
member to store additional keys.
Scheme/
Algorithm
Secrecy Rekeying costs Storage
Backward Forward Join Depart GC Member
GKMP Yes No 2 -- N + 1 2
MARKS Yes Yes Nil Nil Depends on 
duration
Depends on 
subscription
LKH Yes Yes 2 log kN 1c\ogkN - l kN-I  
Jc- 1
\ogk N + 1
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Versakey Yes Yes log, A7 k logA N  - 1 Ic N -1 
k - 1
logA jV + 1
LKH+ Yes Yes 2 log, A log, N k N - I  
k - 1
logA N  + 1
OFT Yes Yes 2 log, N log, N kN  -1  
k - 1
2 logA N  + 1
Optimal key 
storage LKH
Yes Yes \ogkN + \ 2k logA N - 1 2 logA N + 1
Table 1: Comparison table of group key management algorithms for a single data stream
The selection of the algorithm will be based on security requirements of the applications, group 
size, dynamics of the group membership and the amount of computational power and storage the 
GC and the group members have.
4.3.2 Hierarchical Group Key Management Algorithms using Individual 
Rekeying
For applications such as video streaming or online teaching, several multicast sessions may be 
related in one way or another. Figure 4-9 illustrates a multicast video encoded in cumulative 
layers for heterogeneous members. Each member subscribes to a subset of layers in such a way 
the total capacity of the subscribed layers does not exceed the member’s capacity [101][102]. If 
the above multicast sessions are considered using traditional method, the access control issue for 
each data stream is managed separately. This, however, leads to inefficient use of keys and does 
not scale well when the number of data streams increases.
BL - Base Layer 
EL - Enhancement Layer
Figure 4-9: Multicast video encoded in cumulative layers
4.3.2.1 Hierarchical Group Communication Algorithms
Hi-KD has been proposed for hierarchical group communication, where the group members are 
divided into several classes, in [103][104]. Each member can communicate with other members of 
his class. Classes follow a certain hierarchy, with class 1 the highest rank class. Members of a
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given class are able to decrypt messages sent between members of lower rank classes with the 
inverse being impossible. For example, a member in Class 2 in Figure 4-10 can decrypt any 
messages destined for any member in Class 2 to Class 5 but it cannot decrypt any messages 
intended for Class 1.
Two new hierarchical-specific requirements have also been defined: Upward Secrecy and 
Downward Secrecy. They correspond to promotions and degradations of class members. The 
promotion of a class member will give him access to current communications of classes between 
the two classes. However, he should be prevented from accessing old communication of these 
classes. The degradation of a class member should prevent him from accessing future 
communications between the two classes.
Intra-class 
-<--------------------------------►
communication
Class 1 
Class 2 
Class 3 
Class 4
Class 5 Q d   f f f )  T
Figure 4-10: Hierarchical group communication
The main idea of Hi-KD is to relate classes’ key in such a manner that, knowing his own class 
key, a member can compute keys of lower classes. Hi-KD achieves this by using one-way 
function g to compute a chain of keys for the affected classes.
We illustrate this with an example. If a member, u, is joining Class 3, the GC just needs to 
distribute TEKc]ass i to u. With TEKclass 3, u can calculate TEKckss 4 (= g(TEKChss 2)) and
TEKC]ass S (= g2 (TEKc]ass3)). In this case, u only needs to store one group key. Suppose there is
another join event at Class 5, the GC need to distribute TEKc[ass 5 to all affected members
including u. Therefore, after this join event, u needs to store two group keys ( TEKc[ass 3 and
TEKaass 5).
1 4 - 0 = 0
o > = o
(o  o
c>  o
oo
3
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3
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4.3.2.2 Centralised Multi-Group Key Management Algorithm
Two types of groups, data group (DG) and service group (SG) have been defined in [105][106]. A 
DG is a set of members who receives the same single data stream. The information distributed in 
each DG is enciypted with a group key. A SG is a set of members who entitles the same 
privileges and receives exactly the same set of data streams. This is because in existing group 
applications such as video streaming and online teaching, some members might subscribes to 
several similar DGs at the same time. Let Dl,D2,...,DM denote the DGs and Sl,S2,...,SI denote 
the SGs, where Mand /  are the total number of DGs and SGs respectively. For example in Figure 
4-9, there are three DGs (i.e., DBL,DEL\,DEL2) that are corresponding to the BL, ELI and EL2
data streams respectively. Similarly, there are three SGs (i.e. SBL, SELl, SEL2). SBL consists of 
the members in DBL, excluding those members in DEU and DEL2, while SELX consists of the 
members in DELl, excluding those in DEL2. As for SEL2, it consists of the members in DEL2. The 
data group key of Dm is denoted by K f  .
The key tree is constructed in three steps.
Step 1: For each SG Si, construct a subtree having the leaf nodes being the members in S{ and 
the root of the subtree being associated with a key, denoted by K f . These subtrees are 
referred to as the SG-subtrees.
Step 2: For each DG Dm, construct a subtree whose root is the DG key K f  and whose leaf nodes
are Kf of the SGs which are related to this DG. There subtrees are referred to as the DG-
subtrees. In addition to the DG key, assign a session key (SK) to the root of each subtree.
Step 3: Generate the key tree by connecting the leaf node of the DG-subtrees and roots of SG- 
subtree.
This 3-step procedure is illustrated in Figure 4-11 for multicast video encoded with 3 cumulative 
layers and having 4 members in each SG. Some duplicated structures in the DG-subtrees are 
merged to reduce the number of keys on the key tree. In this example, K‘f and K f , which are on 
the same line, are merged. The DG-subtrees of Dx and D2 have the same structure that connect 
Kf and K f . Thus, the parent node of Kf and Kf on DG-subtree of D2 is merged with K f .
Similarly as the key tree approach, the key that a member needs to store is the keys on the path 
from his leaf node to the root of the DG-subtrees.
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Step 1:
Step 2:
Step 3:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Figure 4-11: Centralised multi-group key management key tree construction
4.3.2.3 Discussion
For related multicast sessions, it is more efficient to consider them as a whole to minimise the key 
storage and rekeying costs. Among the two schemes, Hi-KD is only applicable for scenarios 
where the members in one multicast session are a proper subset of the members in another 
multicast session. Although Centralised Multi-Group Key Management Algorithm can be used in 
a wide range of hierarchical group communication applications, the authors did not consider the 
balance of the key tree. We will discuss more on how an unbalanced key tree affects the rekeying 
costs and key storage in Chapter 5. In addition, we also show how we can create a balanced key 
tree for several related multicast sessions.
4.3.3 Batch Rekeying
Immediate rekeying i.e., rekeying after each join or depart request, has two major drawbacks 
[107]. First, it is inefficient since each rekey message has to be signed for authentication purposes 
and a high rate of join/depart requests may result in performance degradation because the signing
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operation is computationally expensive. Second, if the delay in rekey message delivery is high or 
the rate of join/depart requests is high, a member may need a large amount of memory to 
temporarily store the rekey and data messages before they are decrypted.
In such cases, it is possible to relax forward and backward secrecy requirement slightly, to 
alleviate the above problems. A GC may choose to rekey a group periodically, or process group 
membership in batches. Commercial applications such as Internet or satellite TV distribution may 
use batch or periodic rekeying, employing immediate rekeying only in exception circumstances 
(e.g. when evicting misbehaving members).
The responsiveness interval for both individual and batch rekeying are shown in Figure 4-12. It is 
defined as the period of time from the GC receives a join or depart request to the time where all 
members receive the rekey message. In the case of individual rekeying as shown in Figure 
4-12(a), the GC spawns a rekey operation immediately after it receives a request from member 
Ul. At t\, member U1 requests to join or depart the group. Once the GC receives this request at
t2, it immediately changes the necessary KEKs and TEK and then multicast them to all group 
members. Suppose the request sent by Ul is a depart event, member Ul is still able to read those 
data stream that are sent between tx to t3 even though he has departed at tx. In other words, the
responsiveness interval is considered as a vulnerability window since any data sent within the 
responsiveness interval is susceptible to be read by a departing member [107]. The smaller the 
responsiveness interval, the more secure the system is. On the other hand, if the request sent by 
member Ul is a join event, member Ul is not able to deciypt the data stream until t3 even though
he sent the join request at t{. In this case, the responsiveness interval is considered as a delay
window since any data stream sent within the responsiveness interval cannot be read by a joining 
member. Compared to a depart event, the delay window does not affect the security of the system 
but rather the waiting time needed by the joining member. Batch rekeying makes the 
responsiveness interval longer and adjustable by delaying the rekeying operation by the rekey 
interval as shown in Figure 4-12(b). Many applications such as pay-per-view can tolerate such a 
compromise and the rekey interval should be chosen based on the application requirements. For 
example, we can expect there to be a high degree of correlation in member joining and departing 
patterns, e.g., pay-per-view scenario, we can expect a lot of members joining the group at the 
beginning of the broadcast and departing at the end of the broadcast. For other applications, e.g., a 
real-time information deli veiy service, individual members joining or departing patterns are more 
independent [108].
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Figure 4-12: Responsiveness Interval for (a) individual and (b) batch rekeying
4.3.3.1 Marking Algorithm
Marking Algorithm [107][109][110] has been proposed to update the key tree and generate a 
rekey subtree at the end of each rekeying interval with a collection of join and depart requests. 
This rekey subtree is formed using multiple paths corresponding to multiple requests. The 
objectives of the Marking Algorithm are to reduce the rekeying costs, maintain the balanced of 
the key tree and make it efficient for the members to identify the encrypted keys they need. 
Several variations of Marking Algorithm have been proposed [107][109]. The two main 
differences between them are the way the joining members are inserted into the key tree and how 
the algorithm deals with leaf node of the departing members.
For the Marking Algorithm in [107], which we labelled as Marking Algorithm 1, there are four 
cases to consider. If J = L , all departing members are replaced by the joining members, where J 
and L are the total number of joining and departing members. If J <L  , picks J shallowest leaf 
node from the departing members and replaces them by the joining members. For the term 
shallowest node, we mean node on the minimum height. If J > L and L -  0, a shallowest leaf 
node is selected and removed. This leaf node forms a new key tree with the joining members and 
it is inserted at the old location of the removed shallowest leaf node. Lastly, if J > L and L > 0, 
all departing members are replaced by the joining members. A shallowest leaf node is selected 
from these replacements and removed from the key tree. This leaf node is selected from these 
replacements and removed from the key tree. This leaf node forms a new key tree with extra 
joining members and the key tree is inserted at the old location of the removed leaf node. All the 
affected key nodes are marked with the following states accordingly -  DELETE, UPDATE and 
NEW. All nodes that are marked DELETE are removed and nodes that are marked UPDATE or
Responsiveness
Intervalr<----------- >i
GC
f e A
GC
U1 U1
U2 U2
(a)
53
Chapter 4. Group Key Management
NEW form the rekey subtree. The rekey subtree is traversed and new keys are generated and 
distributed to the group members.
Figure 4-13 shows two examples of how the relcey subtree are generated. In Figure 4-13(a), 
assume that there are 2 joining members (U7, U8) and 1 departing member (U4). The GC creates 
a new subtree, which consists of the joining members and placed them at the old location of U4. 
The relcey subtree is traversed and a total of 7 relcey messages are needed (i.e., {Kl'}^ ,{K1'}K3.,
{K3'}K7,, {K3'}K8, (K3'}K9, {K7'}k10 , {K7'}k1] ). For Figure 4-13(b), assume that there are 1 joining
member (U10) and 4 departing members (Ul, U4 to U6), U10 occupies the old location of Ul. 
The location of K3 are marked DELETE. The rekey subtree is traversed and a total of 5 rekey 
messages are needed (i.e. {Kl'}^., {K1'}K4, {K2'}k14 , (K2'}K6, {K2'}K7).
K1 K1
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 U7 U8 U9
\ 7
U10 U2 U3 U4 U5
(b)
U6 U7 U8 U9
U7 U8 
(a)
Figure 4-13: (a) More joins than departs and (b) More departs than joins for Marking Algorithm 1
The algorithm in [109] is here referred to as Marking Algorithm 2. In order to uniquely identify 
each key, the GC assigned an ID to each node in the key tree. The root has the lowest ID, which is
0. For a node with an ID of w, its parent node has an ID of L(w-l)//cJ with its children’s IDs 
ranging from /cw+1 to Icw+k as shown in Figure 4-14.
54
Chapter 4. Group Key Management
Figure 4-14: Node ID assignment
There are only three cases to consider for this Marking Algorithm. Two of them, J -L  and 
J <L , are similar to the Marking Algorithm mentioned above. For J > L , all departing members 
are replaced by the joining members. If there are null leaf nodes in the key tree, they are replaced 
by the joining members starting for the null leaf nodes with the lowest node ID. If there are still 
extra joining members, the member with the lowest node ID are removed and it is inserted as 
children with k - 1 joining members at its old location. The next lowest node ID member is 
selected if there are more joining members. This insertion continues until all joining members 
have been inserted into the key tree. All the affected key nodes are marked with the following 
states accordingly -  DELETE, UPDATE and NEW. After marking the key tree, all nodes that are 
marked DELETE are labelled as null nodes and nodes that are marked UPDATE or NEW form 
the rekey subtree. As before, the rekey subtree is traversed and new keys are generated and 
multicast to the group members.
Using the same examples as Marking Algorithm 1, we can see that the resultant key trees for both 
Marking Algorithms are different. In Figure 4-15(a), U7 is placed at the old location of U4 and 
U8 occupies another key node (Node ID 3) instead of placing as the sibling of U7 as in Marking 
Algorithm 1. In this case, the total number of rekey messages is 6 (i.e., {Kl'J^AKl1}^.,
{K1'}k11 , {K3'}k10, , {K3'}K8, {K3'}K9). As for the example in Figure 4-15(b), U10 is placed at the
old location of UI and all other leaf nodes occupied by the departing members are marked as null. 
As node ID 2 is labelled as DELETE, it is marked as null node as well. The rekey subtree is 
traversed and 5 rekey messages are needed (i.e. {Kl'}^,, {K1'}k4 , {K2'}k14 , {K2'}k6 , {K2'}K7).
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Figure 4-15: (a) More joins than departs and (b) More departs than joins for Marking Algorithm 2
4.3.3.2 Balanced Batch LKH
Balanced Batch LKH has been proposed in [111 ][ 112][113] to keep the binary key tree balanced 
through different batches. There are four main steps that the GC has to perform for every batch:
Step 1: Marking rekeying node
Nodes that should be removed have to be pointed out. After collecting the departing 
requests, all nodes from departing member leaf nodes to root need to be updated, so they 
are marked for deletion.
Step 2: Prune tree
Delete the marked nodes and keep the subtree structure remain unchanged. After this 
action, the GC has to manage three types o f  elements: remaining subtrees (structures with 
more than one member), joining members and siblings o f  departing members. The 
siblings o f  the departing members are treated the same way as new joining members.
Step 3: Mark new rekey tree
The GC can construct the new balanced key tree using the follow ing recursive criterion. 
Group all subtrees o f  depth j in twos. I f  any elements is left, group it with tree o f  depth 
j +1 and treat the result as depth j + 2. The criterion must begin with trees o f  minimum
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depth, that is to say, single elements, and be repeated until just only one key tree is 
resulted.
Step 4: Construct and send rekey messages
Finally, the rekey messages have to be sent. These messages include three information 
fields: destination node, new position o f  destination node and rekeying material.
Figure 4-16 shows two examples o f  how Balanced Batch LKH inserts the joining members into 
the key tree.
U5 joins
v 7
(a) (b)
Figure 4-16: (a) Join event and (b) more departs than join in Balanced Batch LKH
4.3.3.3 Boolean Function Minimisation Techniques
A  scheme known as Boolean Function Minimisation Techniques that can be used to find the 
minimum number o f  rekey messages that are required to be distributed to the remaining group 
members has been proposed in [114].
In this scheme, each member o f  the group is associated with a unique member ID (UID) which is 
binary string o f  length n, where n depends upon the size o f  the multicast group. Consequently, an 
UID can be written as Xn i,Xn 2,...,X0 , where X. can be either 0 or 1. When a member with
UID Xn_l,Xn 2,...,X0 registers with the GC to join  a session, it receives the TEK. Additionally,
U4 and U7 depart 
U8 joins
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the member receives a set of n auxiliary keys drawn from a set of n key pairs. Each key pair 
corresponds to a bit in the UID. For example in Figure 4-17, member UI with UID 000 receives
KO , KI and, K2 and U8 with UID 111 receives KO, KI, K2.
Suppose that member UI with UID 000 and U5 with UID 100 in Figure 4-17 wish to depart from 
the group. It is sufficient to multicast the following two rekey messages containing the new group 
key, {TEK'}ko and (TEK'}k1 . The first rekey message can be decrypted only by U2, U4, U6, U8
and the second only by U3, U4, U7, U8. Intuitively, the number of rekey messages is reduced 
when the UIDs of the remaining group members have, one or several bits in common that are 
different from the excluded members’ UIDs.
TEK
4.3.3.4 Discussion
Similarly to individual rekeying, most batch rekeying schemes have adapted the key tree approach 
for scalable rekeying. Existing schemes such as Marking Algorithms either produce an 
unbalanced key tree or require extra rekeying costs to balance the key tree. Although Balanced 
Batch LKH can create a balanced key tree for eveiy batch, it is only suitable for a binary key tree. 
It has been shown that the outdegree of the key tree is optimum at 3 [115]. As for Boolean 
Function Minimisation Technique, this scheme suffers from collusion issue where several 
departing members can combine their keys to derive the new group key. To obtain a better 
performance in term of rekeying costs and key storage, we have proposed three algorithms in 
Chapter 6 that create a balanced key tree over time as members join and/or depart without adding 
extra network costs.
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4.4 Distributed Design
Various systems and networking issues make it difficult to consistently route rekey message from 
a single GC to a large, widely dispersed group of members in a timely manner. The first potential 
hazard is failure of the GC, which is fatal to the group in any centralised solution. The second 
problem that can occur is a network failure. If there is a high traffic load or a partition somewhere 
in the network, some members may receive key updates more quickly than others, or may miss a 
key update altogether. This not only inhibits secure communication among legitimate members of 
the group, but also creates potential security vulnerabilities in which past group members can 
exploit the fact that not all current members are using the same key. A malicious member could 
send illegitimate messages enciypted using stale keys to the group, or could coax some current 
members into sending legitimate messages to the group under stale keys. A centralised GC also 
suffers from “1 affects N” problem, in which means every member in the group is affected by a 
join or depart request. Clearly, a centralised key management solution is not a robust design. 
Systems and networks often slow down or fail; we need a distributed architecture that can deal 
effectively with these realities.
4.4.1 Hierarchical Subgroup Architecture
Iolus [116] has been proposed to addresses the problems of efficient key updates by partitioning a 
multicast group into a hierarchy of subgroups, each with relatively few members. The architecture 
uses a secure distribution tree to create the illusion of a single group of the members in each 
subgroup. The tree is composed of Group Security Agents (GSAs), trusted entities that coordinate 
packet routing and manage security for the group. The GSA at the root of the tree is called the 
Group Security Controller (GSC) and the other GSAs are called Group Security Intermediaries 
(GSIs). Each subgroup has its own cryptographic keys. The GSI is responsible for managing its 
subgroup’s key and, translating data from one key to another and routing it to other GSIs as 
appropriate.
Since Iolus uses independent keys for each subgroup and the absence of a general group key 
makes membership changes in a subgroup to be treated locally. In other words, changes that affect 
a subgroup are not reflected to other subgroups. Also, the absence of a centralised controller 
contributes to the fault-tolerance of the system. If a GSA fails, only its subgroup is affected.
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GSI
M
Figure 4-18: Iolus
4.4.2 Hierarchical Group Key Management Framework
A hierarchical framework for group key management has been proposed in [117]. Two hierarchy 
of regions are introduced, namely one trunk region and one or more leaf regions. The trunk region 
is bounded by Border Key Managers (BKMs) and does not contain any members 
(senders/receivers). All members are defined to exist within leaf regions, each of which is 
bounded by one border key manager, which is also a member of the trunk region. The purpose of 
introducing leaf regions and a trunk region is for the framework to inherently promote scalability 
by allowing regions to be defined according to the available entities, protocols and multicast 
applications. Figure 4-19 illustrates this design.
Leaf Leaf Leaf
Figure 4-19: Hierarchical group key management framework
Group Security Controller 
Group Security Intermediate 
Member
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The border key managers for each leaf region participate in a key management protocol for a 
trunk key. The trunk key allows the border key manager for each leaf region to act as a message 
translator, sending and receiving messages to and from other leaf regions. The details of trunk key 
management are unspecified; however, the trunk key could be managed by a centralised trunk 
controller or negotiated between the border key managers.
As noted previously, partition a multicast group into subgroup (leaf regions) localise the effect of 
membership changes. Another benefit of this architecture is that it allows each leaf region to 
employ its own key management techniques.
4.4.3 Intra-domain Group Key Management
An intra-region group key management protocol has been proposed in [118]. There is a Domain 
Key Distributor (DKD) and many Area Key Distributors (AKDs). Each AKD is responsible for 
one area. The group key is generated by the DKD and is propagated to the members through the 
AKDs. The DKD and AKDs belong to a multicast group called Ail-KD-group. The All-KD-group 
is used by the DKD to transmit the rekey messages to the AKDs, who in turn rekey their 
respective areas. All areas in the domain use the same group key. Therefore, data streams do not 
need to be translated when passing from one area to another.
DKD -  Domain Key Distributor 
AKD -  Area Key Distributor
Figure 4-20: Intra-domain group key management protocol
4.4.4 Dual Encryption Protocol (DEP)
In order to solve the problem of trusting third parties, a Dual Enciyption Protocol (DEP) has been 
proposed in [119]. In this work, a hierarchical subgrouping of the members, where a subgroup 
manager (SGM) controls each subgroup, has been suggested. Three types of KEKs and one TEK 
have been defined: KEKn is shared between a SGMt and its subgroup members. KEKn is
shared between the GC and the group member of subgroup i excluding SGM. . Finally, GC shares
KEK.^  with SGMt. In order to distribute the TEK to the group members, the GC generates and
All-KD-group
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transmits a message containing the TEK encrypted with KEKi2 and encrypted again with KEKn . 
Upon receiving the message, SGM. deciypts its part o f the message using KEKn and recovers 
the TEK enciypted with its subgroup KEK (i.e. KEKn ), which is not known by the SGMj . The 
SGMi encrypts this enciypted TEK using KEKn shared with its subgroup members and sends it 
out to subgroup i. Each member o f subgroup i deciypts the message using KEKn and then 
decrypting the message using KEKn to recover the TEK. Therefore, the TEK cannot be
recovered by any entity that does not know both keys. Hence, although there are third parties 
involved in the management (SGMs), they do not have access to the group key (TEK). When the 
membership o f subgroup i changes, the SGM. changes KEK, and sends it to its members. 
Future TEK changes cannot be accessed for members o f subgroup i that did not received the new 
KEK,.
4.4.5 Topology-Matching Key Management (TMKM)
Topology Matching Key Management (TMKM) [120][121] has been proposed to reduce the 
relcey messages from crossing portions o f the network that do not have members who need to be 
rekeyed. This is achieved by designing the key management tree matching the network topology 
in such a way that the neighbours on the key tree are also physical neighbours on the network. By 
delivering the relcey messages only to the members who need them, the delivery o f  rekey 
messages are localised to small regions o f the network; in other word, this lessens the amount o f 
traffic crossing portions o f the network that do not have members who need to be rekeyed. 
However, this requires the assistance o f  entities such as the base stations (BS) and supervisor 
hosts (SH) in wireless environment that control the rekey message transmission.
There are three steps to build the TMKM system:
• Step 1: Design a subtree for the members under each BS. These subtrees are referred to as 
member-subtrees.
• Step 2: Design subtrees that govern the key hierarchy between the BSs and the SH. These 
subtrees are referred to as BS-subtrees.
• Step 3: Design a subtree that governs the key hierarchy between the SH and the GC. This 
subtree is referred to as the SH-subtree.
The system can be classified into two categories:
• One-SH system: In the first category, each SH can be looked at as a local GC and is 
responsible for performing key management for a subset o f the group members who
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reside in the regions where this GC is in charge. The GCs are independent and may even 
adopt different key management schemes. In this system, the TMKM tree consists o f 
member-subtrees and a BS subtree.
Figure 4-21: Topology-Matching Key Management (TMKM) - One-SH system
• Multiple-SH system: In the second category, SHs do not perform key management. 
Instead, there is a GC that manages keys for all members. This GC can be the service 
provider or a trusted third party. In this system, the TMKM consists o f member-subtrees, 
BS-subtrees, and a SH subtree.
4.4.6 Immediate Rekey
Immediate Rekey [ 122][ 123][ 124] has been proposed to consider member mobility between 
areas. It adopts the same architecture concept in [118]. Inside each area, there is an Area Group 
Controller (AGC) responsible the group members in that area. All registration and deregistration 
are handled by the AGC as well. When a mobile member, u, wishes to transfer from area i to area 
j ,  a signalling message is sent to both affected AGCs. Both AGCs perform rekeying in their 
respective area. In other words, the member only holds the KEKs o f the area in which it currently 
resides. Since there is no change in the overall group membership, the TEK does not need to be 
changed.
63
Chapter 4. Group Key Management
However, this scheme is not practical for multicast group with mobile members transferred 
between areas frequently as rekeying operation is needed in both old and new areas.
4.4.7 First Entry Delayed Rekey + Periodic (FEDRP)
First Entry Delayed Rekey + Periodic [122][123][124] has been proposed to alleviate the 
inefficiency in IR. As before, FEDRP uses the architecture in [118]. In this scheme, a member, u, 
can accumulate the KEKs as he visits different areas; in other words, the AGC in the old area, 
AGCz, does not perform rekeying). If u has previously visited area j ,  no rekeying occurs. If not, 
new KEKs are generated for area j . To trace members’ movement history, each AGC keeps a list 
o f  those members that hold valid KEKs while residing outside the area. This list is reset when one 
o f  the members in the list departs from the group or when the FEDRP timer expires. The puipose 
o f  the FEDRP timer is to limit the time that valid KEKs can be held by a member outside the area.
4.4.8 Discussion
A distributed design partitions the members into several areas, where there is at least one GC 
responsible for each area. This help to prevent performance bottleneck and single point o f failure 
in centralised design. Generally, all proposed schemes can be classified into two categories -  
Common TEK or Independent TEK. Those schemes that fall under Common TEK category are 
Intra-domain Group Key Management, DEP, TMKM, IR and FEDRRP where all members share 
the same group key. In this category, a trusted entity is responsible for generating and distributing 
the group key to all GCs in the area, which in turn distribute it to their respective members. As for 
Independent TEK, each area uses an independent group key which makes membership changes in 
an area to be treated locally. In other words, changes that affect a subgroup are not reflected to 
other subgroups. However, the encrypted multicast data stream needs to be translated from one 
group key to another group key when it is passed between areas. Those schemes that fall under 
this category are Iolus and Hierarchical Group Key Management.
Mobility further complicates the distributed design by not only allowing members to join, depart 
but also transfer between areas in wireless environment. Existing schemes that have considered 
member mobility perform rekeying unnecessary or periodically resulting in huge redundant 
rekeying costs. In chapter 7, we show how we can minimise the rekeying costs for distributed 
design in wireless enviromnent.
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4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have focused on the management o f cryptographic keying material in a secure 
group. Specifically, we have investigated how a group member can obtain the group key in order 
to gain access to the multicast data stream. We have also presented the criteria for evaluating the 
key management solutions.
As the group membership might be dynamic, we have studied how we can maintain forward and 
backward secrecy for a single and related data streams. In other words, new group members 
cannot read past messages and past group members cannot read current or future messages. There 
are also some cases where we can relax the security requirement to achieve better performance, 
thus in such case, we do not perform rekeying after each membership changes. Instead, the 
joining and departing members are consolidated in a batch before rekeying is performed.
From the architecture point o f  view, a centralised design suffers from a single point o f  failure and 
performance degradation for large dynamic groups. Furthermore, eveiy member is affected by a 
join or depart request. Thus, a distributed design is preferred.
We have also discussed some o f  the existing schemes that have been proposed for both centralised 
and distributed design in this chapter.
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Chapter 5
5 Scalable Hierarchical Group Key 
Management Algorithm
In this chapter, we study how we can minimise the key storage and rekeying costs needed by both 
the Group Controller (GC) and group members for several related multicast sessions. In addition, 
we also take the balance o f the key tree into consideration to allow similar key storage among 
members and preserve the rekeying efficiency o f key tree approach. In this work, we have 
adopted the concept o f Data Group (DG) and Service Group (SG) in [105][106]. Before proceed, 
we introduce some notation and definitions used in this chapter.
N Total number o f group members
lc Outdegree o f key tree
H Maximum height o f the key tree
Minimum height o f  the key tree
Data Group o f m
s , Service Group o f i
M Total number o f DGs
I Total number o f SGs
TEKm Data group key o f Data Group m
<i> Keyset associated with the member
g One-way function
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5.1 Efficiency of the key tree
The efficiency o f the key tree approach depends critically on whether the key tree remains 
balanced [112][113][125]. A  key tree is considered balanced if the distance from the root to any 
two leaf node differs by not more than one [125]. For a balanced key tree with N  leaf nodes, the 
height from the root to any leaf node is logk N  , where k is the outdegree o f  the key tree and N  is
the total number o f  group members. However, if the key tree becomes unbalanced, the distance 
from the root to a leaf node can become as high as N. Figure 5-1 shows an unbalanced key tree. 
First o f  all, we can see that the key storage among the group members varies from 3 to 6 rather 4 
in a balanced binary key tree o f  8 members. Secondly, Ul or U2 needs 5 decryptions if its sibling 
departs rather 3 decryptions in a balanced key tree. Lastly, the rekeying cost is 9 when Ul or U2 
departs since KO, K l, K3, K7, and Kl 1 need to be changed. For a balanced key tree, the rekeying 
cost for a departing member is only 5. In this example, the difference between balanced and 
unbalanced varies slightly as the group size is small. In scenario such as pay-per-view where the 
group membership varies from thousands to millions o f members, an unbalanced key tree might 
lead to significant computation efforts for both GC and group members.
KO
( o )
K l ——— ~— - _ _ K 2
( 1 ) ( 2 )
K 3 ^ > m Q k4 K 5 ^ S ~ ± _ K 6
( 3  ) ( 4 )  ( 5  ) ( 6
K7><K8 K9><C kig Klf><K12 K13><K14
7 j ( V ) m o ) M l ) M 2 ) M 3 ) M 4 J
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 U7 U8
(a)
Figure 5-1: (a) Balanced key tree and (b) unbalanced key tree
5.2 Multi-Layers Balanced Logical Key Hierarchy (M LB -LK H )
Since the efficiency o f LKH depends on the balance o f  the key tree, we trade-off additional rekey 
message for a balanced key tree. In this work, the DGs are denoted by Dx, D2,..., DM and the
SGs are denoted by S{ , S2,..., Sn  where M  is the total number o f DGs and /  is the total number 
o f SGs. Each SG is associated with a 1-by-M binary vector. In particular, each SG is associated
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with Vj = [v\,v'2,...,v'M\, and v’m = 1 only when the group members in the SG fy subscribe to the
DG Dm, i.e., fy = {D ,, v|} n  {D2, v2} n ... n  {DM, v'M} where {Dm, 0} = Dm and {Dm, 1} = Dm . For 
example, in Figure 4-9, there are three DGs that are corresponding to the BL, ELI and EL2 data 
streams respectively. SBL consists o f  the members in DBL, excluding those members in DEL] and
Del2 (he., SBL = Dbl c\(Delj u D EL2) )  while SEL] consists the members in DELl excluding those
in DEL2 (i.e., SELX = DELX n  DEL2). As for SEL2, it consists o f the members in DEL2 (i.e.,
R EL2 ~  D EL2 )•
We use separate key to encrypt the data stream for each DG. Thus, the members in each DG share 
a key, referred to as data group key, which is used to encrypt the data stream for this DG. The 
data group key for Dm is denoted TEKm. Therefore, the members in fy must possess
{TEKm,Mm: vm = 1} . Figure 5-2 shows how the multicast video encoded in cumulative layers in
Figure 4-9 can be mapped onto our Multi-Layers Balanced Logical Key Hierarchy (MLB-LKH). 
Each member not only receives the Key Enciyption Keys (KEKs) on its leaf node to root but also 
the data group keys that are used to encrypt the data streams that it subscribes to. It can be seen 
that the GC needs to multicast TEKBL twice. For example, member UI stores TEKBL , KI, K2,
K4, K8 and, K16 whereas member U15 stores TEKBL , TEKelx , TEKEL2 , KI, K3, K7, K15, and
□  BL TEK 
A  EL1 TEK
O  EL2 TEK
U1 to U4 => BL 
U5to U12 => EL1 
U13 to U16 => EL2
Figure 5-2: Mapping o f multicast video encoded in cumulative layers in MLB-LKH
The placement o f  the members in MLB-LKH is important since proper placement can minimise 
the number o f rekey messages needed by the members. As shown in Figure 5-2, all SGs form at 
least one key tree o f  its own and related SGs are placed side by side. As the multicast sessions
K30.
K16 K17 K18 K19 K20 K21K22 K23 K24 K25 K26 K27 K28 K29 K30 K31 
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 U7 U8 U9 U10U11U12U13U14U15U16
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might be dynamic, the GC must place the joining members according to their SGs. There are five 
steps to initialise our MLB-LKH.
1. > Group the members according to their SGs.
2. Arrange the SGs according to their relevance (i.e., S{, S2,..., Sf ).
3. Create a key tree o f height, H  -  TlogA N ~\, with outdegree o f k.
4. Starting from the first SG, Sx, insert the members one by one at the leaf node beginning 
from the left. After all members in Sl have been inserted, continue with members in S2 . 
Repeat this step until all members, N, have been inserted as shown in Figure 5-3.
5. Assign the TEKs to the respective key nodes in the key tree.
s, s2 s3 SM s,
Figure 5-3: Initialisation o f MLB-LKH
Switching between SGs (i.e., Sj to S j) is normal when a member requires additional service or
does not require that service anymore (e.g. a member might wish to subscribe for a higher quality 
multicast video due to the ample amount o f bandwidth). To achieve forward and backward 
secrecy, the GC must update the data group key o f { Dm, \/m : v'm = 1 and vJm = 0 } and data group
key o f { Dm, Vra: vPI = 0 and vjm = 1 }. The only way is to treat that member as a departing 
member in the old SG (i.e., SQ and a joining member in its desired SG (i.e., S j ). Let denote 
the keyset associated with the member’s previous position, and j>. denote the keyset associated 
with the member’s new position. The GC first updates the keys in <j>. n  using the same
procedure for adding a joining member and then it updates the keys in <f>i n  similar as
removing a departing member. We illustrate this with an example, where U1 in Figure 5-2 
switches from 8>bl to SELj . We assume that U5 is split to accommodate U1 and they share a new 
KEK, denoted by K32. As for U2, it will move up and occupy KEK node that is previously
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associated with K8. In this example, <j)BL is {KI, K2, K4, TEKBL } and <pEIA is {KI, K2, K5, K10, 
TEKBL, TEKelj } .  It is important to note that K16 does not need be changed since it is only 
shared by the U1 and the GC. The GC first updates the keys in tj)BL C\<t>ELl (i.e., K5\ K10' and 
TEKEL]). All these keys are encrypted • with the old version o f the same key. Then the GC 
generates new version o f keys in (f>BL n  <j>ELi (i.e., K4') and encrypts it with the KEKs o f its 
children. The rekey messages that need to be multicast to the group are {K5'}ks , {K5'}k16 , 
{K1O'}k10, {K10'}k16, {TEKm }mKm, {TEKeu }k k , {K 4'}*,, {K4’}ki7, {K32}k16> and 
{K32}K20. The resultant key tree is shown in Figure 5-4.
□  BLTEK 
A  EL1TEK
O  EL2TEK
K16K20 
U1 U5
Figure 5-4: Resultant key tree
5.3 Optimisations
Regardless o f whether the data streams continue to flow or are halted during relceying, there might 
be problem for the members. Halting the data streams add waiting latency which may affect real­
time applications such as video streaming. On the other hand, if the data streams still continue to 
flow during rekeying, it causes buffering problem for members with limited storage since they 
need to buffer all packets before they can be deciypted. To alleviate the above issues, there are 
two approaches. The first one is to reduce the number o f rekeying operations while still 
maintaining forward and backward secrecy and the second one is to speed up the time the 
members receive the data group keys. With these, we propose two optimisations.
The first optimisation is when a member, USi_+s , wish to switch from S. to Sj , where the TEKs
in Sj are a proper subset o f TEKs in Sj (i.e., {TEKm,V m : v‘m = 1}SG. c: [TEKm,\/rn: vjm = 1}SG ).
Instead o f treating Us _^ s as a departing member in St and a joining member in Sj as above, the
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GC can multicast {TEKSj}TEKs to the existing members in Sj and unicast TEKS to Us,->Sj
encrypted with its individual key. This is because all the other TEKs and KEKs are unaffected by 
such switching. However, this optimisation requires the GC to keep a list o f  the members who 
perform such switching. The actual switching o f Us^ Sj takes place when there is a join, depart or
other form o f switching events.
The second optimisation is for members who subscribe more layers than others. One way is allow 
the members to perform one way function, g, 011 the TEK in the highest affected layer to generate 
the TEK in the lower layer. Assume the highest affected SG is m, the members in SG Sm need to
perform m times one way function, g m(TEKm) = TEK0> to obtain all necessary TEKs for the
multicast session as shown in Figure 5-5. As for the required KEKs, it can take its time to decrypt 
the necessary rekey messages while receiving the data streams at the same time. For example, in 
Figure 5-2, one member in 8ELI is departing, both TEKBL and TEKeli need to be changed. The
members in SELl just need to receive TEKeli and perform one way function on it in order to
obtain TEKBL . This optimisation reduces the number o f rekey messages as well, which leads to 
bandwidth saving.
Generate
TEK,  ---------  TEK,  m m  TEKm ^  TEKm
g(TEK,) g(TEK2)
Figure 5-5: Generation of TEKs using one-way chain
5.4 Analysis
The performance o f key tree approach depends on storage, computation and communication 
overhead. Similar to [94][95][96][97][98], we assume that our MLB-LKH is fully loaded and 
balanced. Assume we have a balanced key tree with height, H, the maximum number o f members 
that can be accommodated at height H  is kH, where H  is f  log/c N ~\. If the balanced key tree 
contains members at levels H0 and H0+ 1 as shown in Figure 5-6, the total number o f nodes at 
H0 that are not occupied by members is [(N  -  kH°) /(/c -1 )1 , where H0 =LlogA vVj . Thus, the 
total number o f members who are in H0 can be calculated by:
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r JV — /c 0 -iNumber o f  members in H0 = k 0 - 1------------ | (5.1)
k -1
As for the total number o f members in H0 +1, it can be calculated by:
N  — kH°
Number o f members in H0 +1 = N  -  kH° + f ----------- ]  (5.2)
k — 1
Figure 5-6: Balanced key tree
In order for the GC to perform rekeying, it needs to store all the keys in the key tree (i.e., TEKs, 
KEKs and individual keys), therefore its storage is:
k N -l  w
storage -  + (5.3)
As for the member, it needs to store the keys from its leaf node to the root and the necessary 
TEKs o f the DGs it subscribes to, therefore the maximum number o f keys that a member needs to 
store is:
U s t o r a g e = 1O g A - Y  + M  + l
(5.4)
For a join event, the worst rekeying cost, RCWorst Join, happens when a joining member subscribes 
to all DGs, the rekeying cost is:
R-Cworstjoin = 2 log,,. N + M
Similarly for a depart event, the worst rekeying cost, RCWorst Depart, happens when a member who 
subscribes to all DGs departs from the group, the rekeying costs is:
WorstJDepart = ^ N + M
(5.6)
As a member might switch from one SG to another SG (e.g. SG A to SG B) during the multicast 
session, it might result into best or worst rekeying cost as shown in Figure 5-7. The worst
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rekeying cost, RCWorst Switching, happens when there is no interception point between the previous 
SG and the new SG other than the root as shown in Figure 5-7(a). It can be calculated by:
RCWorst_Switching (k + 2)(logA-D-l
(5.7)
Figure 5-7: (a) Worst case and (b) Best case of switching between SGs
Suppose there is an interception point, /, between the previous SG and the new SG as shown in 
Figure 5-7(b), the best switching rekeying cost, RCBcst Switching, is:
RCBest Swj,ching — (/c + 2)(log(t N  I 1) 1
(5.8)
5.5 Simulation results
We have performed some simulations to compare the performance o f  our MLB-LKH with 
traditional approach. We use Matlab to calculate the rekeying costs and storage needed by the GC 
and group member. The scenario we adopt for our simulation is multicast video encoded with 4 
cumulative layers. We use a binary key tree with group members ranging from 0 to 8096 and the 
group members are divided into 2/16, 6/16, 7/16 and 1/16 for each layer respectively. It is 
important to note that other outdegree will yield similar result as well.
Figure 5-8 shows the key storage for both the GC and group members. The key storage o f the GC 
in LKH grows at a faster rate compared- to MLB-LKH. This is because in LKH, each multicast 
session is considered separately and this causes a lot o f redundant keys to be stored by the GC. 
Although there are several published works on minimisation o f key storage needed by the GC, 
which can minimise these effects [100] [112], the members still require a significant amount o f 
storage if each multicast session is considered separately. The more services the group members 
subscribe to, the more redundant keys the group members need to store. As for MLB-LKH, the 
difference in key storage between the group members is at most M. In Figure 5-8(b), we can see 
that in LKH, the members in the highest layer need to store thrice the number o f keys than the 
members in MLB-LKH. For both LKH and MLB-LKH, the group member’s key storage grows at
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a much slower rate when the number o f group members exceeds 1000. This is because the total 
number o f members that can be accommodated in the key tree double each time for every 
increment in height. However, the number o f  group members in the key tree has significant 
effects on the GC side since it needs to store the individual keys o f all group members as well as 
KEKs.
GC Storage (4 Layers)
+  LKH 
MLB-LKH
10000
Number of Members Number of Members
(a) (b)
Figure 5-8: (a) GC’s key storage and (b) Group member’s storage for LKH and MLB-LKH
Members Storage (4 Layers)
In Figure 5-9 and Figure 5-10, we investigate the effects o f  individual join and depart event on 
LKH and MLB-LKH. When the affected member is in layer 2 or higher, the rekeying cost for 
LKH is at least twice compared to MLB-LKH. As before, the higher the affected layer, the higher 
the rekeying costs. For both algorithms, the rekeying costs for adding a joining member is higher 
compared to the rekeying costs for evicting an existing member because we started with a 
completely balanced key tree for all layers. In this example, the rekeying cost for joining and 
departing member in each layer for LKH and MLB-LKH is 2Iogz N0 + 2 and 21og2 JV0 -1
respectively, where N0 is the total number o f group members in the key tree.
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LKH Joining Costs LKH Departing Costs
(a) (b)
Figure 5-9: (a) Joining and (b) Departing costs in LKH
MLB-LKH Joining Costs MLB-LKH Departing Costs
(a) (b)
Figure 5-10: (a) Joining and (b) Departing costs in MLB-LKH
As it is common for group members to subscribe additional services or unsubscribe unwanted 
services, Figure 5-11 and Figure 5-12 investigate all possibilities o f  switching for both algorithms. 
Usually, the rekeying costs for LKH is better compared to MLB-LKH when the group member 
switches by one layer regardless o f  whether that member is joining or departing from the 
multicast group. This is because only one key tree in LKH needs to be rekeyed for such changes 
whereas two SGs in MLB-LKH are affected. As for other switching possibilities, MLB-LKH 
tends to outperform LKH when two or more key trees in LKH are affected.
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LKH Switching (Low to High)
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Figure 5-11: LKH switching -  (a) Low layer to high layer and (b) High layer to low layer
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Figure 5-12: MLB-LKH switching -  (a) Low layer to high layer and (b) High layer to low layer
Although centralised multi-group key management scheme considers related multicast sessions as 
a whole, our approach differs from theirs by trading off rekeying costs for similar key storage and 
similar number o f decryptions among group members. Suppose there are a lot o f related multicast 
layers and if the higher layer is very heavily populated compared to the lower layer, the number o f 
decryptions that are needed can be quite significant for centralised multi-group key management 
scheme. Reducing the number o f decryptions can reduce the waiting latency if the data streams 
are halted until all remaining members get the keys.
For our simulation, we adopted the scenario where the video is encoded with 5 cumulative layers. 
Binary key tree with three different group sizes (i.e., 10000, 100000, 1000000) are used. The 
splitting o f the group members are 5%, 10%, 10%, 30%, and 45% for each layer respectively.
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From Figure 5-13, we can see the difference between the lowest and highest layer for centralised 
multi-group key management is around 10 keys. This means that eveiy member that is joining or 
departing the highest layer will need 10 additional decryptions compared to the member that is 
joining or departing in the lowest layer. In addition, the rekeying cost will be higher. As for MLB- 
LKH, the difference between the lowest and highest layer is just the number o f layers in the 
multicast sessions.
Centralised Multi-Group Key Management Scheme MLB-LKH
(a) (b)
Figure 5-13: Key storage at different layers for (a) Centralised multi-group key management scheme
and (b) MLB-LKH
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed how an unbalanced key tree affects the efficiency o f the key 
tree approach. For several related multicast sessions, the GC and group members may need to 
store a lot o f  redundant keys if these related multicast sessions are treated separately. To alleviate 
the above issues, we have proposed an algorithm, which we referred to as Multi-Layers Balanced 
Logical Key Hierarchy (MLB-LKH) that tries to create a balanced key tree for several related 
multicast sessions.
For our simulation using video encoded with 4 cumulative layers, the key storage at the GC and 
members’ side is reduced by at least half compared to LKH. As for the individual join and depart 
rekeying costs, the higher the affected layer, the higher the rekeying costs in LKH. In the case o f 
our MLB-LKH, the difference in rekeying costs for a join or depart event is at most M. However, 
we observe that when a member switches by one layer, regardless o f  whether that member is 
joining or departing the group, the rekeying cost is generally lower for LKH due to the fact that 
only the affected key tree needs to be rekeyed whereas two SGs in MLB-LKH are affected. For
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other switching possibilities, MLB-LKH tends to be better than LKH. However, MLB-LKH 
requires proper placement o f  members in the key tree in order to minimise the rekeying costs. 
Most importantly, the members must be grouped according to their SGs. When compared to 
Centralised Multi-Group Key Management scheme, we trade-off rekeying costs for a balanced 
key tree. This not only allows the members to have similar key storage but also similar number o f 
decryptions whenever there is a change in group membership.
Although we varied the total number o f members in the group from 1024 to 8192 in our 
simulation, it is important to note that the key storage and rekeying cost can also be quite 
significant for groups with smaller size. For example, if the group contains 128 members, the keys 
that need to be stored by a member in a binary key tree are 8 keys compared to 11 keys for a 
member in a binaiy key tree o f  1024 members. This is because the total o f  number o f members 
that can be accommodated in the key tree doubles each time for eveiy increment in height.
As there might be problem for the group members regardless o f whether the data stream continue 
to flow or halt during rekeying. We have proposed two optimisation techniques to further enhance 
our algorithm. The first one is to reduce the number o f rekeying operations when a member 
switches between SGs, where the TEKs in the old SG are a proper subset o f the TEKs in the new 
SG. The GC just needs to generate a new TEK for the new SG and distributes it to the existing 
members in that SG and the joining member. The second optimisation allows the members to 
receive the affected TEKs quickly. This is achieved by allowing the members to perform one way 
function on the TEK in the highest affected layer to get the TEK in the lower layer. As for the 
KEKs, the members can take its time to decrypt the rekey messages while receiving the data 
streams at the same time.
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Chapter 6
6 Balanced Batch Rekeying Algorithms
As explained in Chapter 5, the efficiency o f the key tree approach depends critically on whether 
the key trees remains balanced. In this chapter, we have proposed three algorithms, two Merging 
Algorithms and a Batch Balanced Algorithm that try to balance the key tree over time as members 
join or depart. The two Merging Algorithms are suitable for batch join requests. To additionally 
handle batch depart requests, we extend these two Merging Algorithms into a Batch Balanced 
Algorithm.
Before proceed, we introduce some notation and definitions used in this chapter. We use 
‘minimum height’ to mean the minimum number o f levels in a tree or subtree from the root to any 
leaf node. Similarly, we use ‘maximum height’ to mean the maximum number o f levels in a tree 
or subtree from the root to any leaf node. We define the following variables:
N Total number o f group members
D Number o f departing members
J Number o f joining members
k Outdegree o f key tree
m Node ID
h Height o f  key tree (1 + logfr N  )
B m i n
Minimum height o f leaf node in key tree
b m a x
Maximum height o f leaf node in key tree
H INSERT H mn o f ST A - o f  ST_B
B M IN _ S T _ A B m i n  ofST_A
B m a x _ s t _ a H max °fST_A
b m i n _ s t _ b H Min ofST_B
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H M A X  ST B o f ST B
6.1 Batch Rekeying Algorithms
We have proposed two Merging Algorithms to combine subtrees together in a way that is suitable 
for batch join events. To handle all cases such as depart or both join and depart requests, we 
extend these two Merging Algorithms into Batch Balanced Algorithm. These two Merging 
Algorithms are used to combine two subtrees, ST_A and ST_B. We assume that ST_A has a 
greater height than ST_B, and both subtrees are o f the same outdegree, k.
6.1.1 Merging Algorithm 1
This algorithm is only used when the difference in the maximum height between the two key 
trees, ST_A and ST_B, is greater or equal to one. We will see why this is so in the next section.
We now describe the Merging Algorithm 1 and illustrate it with some examples. The criteria for 
choosing Merging Algorithm 1 are when the difference between H MAX ST A and HMlN ST B is
greater than one and the difference between HMAX ST A and HMAX ST B is greater or equal to
one. If both these conditions are fulfilled, the algorithm calculates HJNSERT as illustrated in Figure
HINSERT — 1 
Hmin_st_a = 2 
Hmax_ st_a = 3 
Hmin_st_b — 1 
Hmax_st_b -  1
Step 1: For k > 2 , the algorithm searches for an empty child node in ST_A at either HINSERT or 
level H insert - 1 .  If H insert = 0 , then levels 0 and 1 are searched. If such a node exists, 
the algorithm inserts ST_B as the child o f that particular key node.
Step 2: If step 1 does not find an empty node, mark as follow a suitable key node in ST_A at level 
H i n s e r t  f° r insertion. If H INSERT = 0 , a suitable key node at level 1 is marked. The 
marked key node is given by the one with the greatest number o f leaf nodes at level
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H mn st a . For example, in Figure 6-1, there are two key nodes at level 1 (=  H !NSERT). 
O f these, key node ID 2 is marked for insertion since it has two leaf nodes at level 
H mn st a whereas key node ID 1 has only one.
Step 3: For k > 2 when an empty node is not found in step 1, the algorithm searches the root o f 
ST_B for an empty node. If this exists, the algorithm inserts the marked key node from 
step 2 as the child o f  S T B  and inserts ST_B at the old location o f the marked key node.
Step 4: For k = 2 , or for J o  2 if step 1 to 3 have not inserted ST_B into ST_A, the algorithm 
creates a new key node at the old location o f the marked key node (from step 2) and 
inserts the marked key node and ST_B as its children.
Finally, the GC may need to multicast at most one update message to inform the affected 
members. We will discuss the update message later in this section. After updating the affected 
nodes, the members can identify the set o f  the keys they need in the rekey messages.
Figure 6-2 shows how we can combine the two key tree using step 1 in Merging Algorithm 1. 
Figure 6-2(a) shows only part o f ST_A. Suppose there are 3 joining members and no departing 
members, which are formed into a new subtree, ST_B, as shown in Figure 6-2(b). Since there is 
an empty node on level HINSERT -1  in ST_A (node ID 13), ST_B is inserted at that particular
node. The resultant key tree is shown in Figure 6-2(c). In this example, no update message is 
needed.
K1
©
i d -K10
uo) © (42)
© (122) © (126) © © w
K4 K5 K6 K7 K8 K9 K11 K12 K13
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 U7 U8 U9
Figure 6-2: (a) Part of key tree in ST_A, (b) ST_B (3 members) and (c) resultant key tree
Figure 6-3 shows another example where k = 2 and we therefore need to apply only step 2 and 4. 
We have a balanced subtree (ST_A) with 8 members. Assume 2 members wish to join the group. 
These 2 members form a new key tree (ST_B) as shown in Figure 6-3 (b). For these subtrees, 
H i n s e r t  =  2. In step 2, we perfonn our marking. Since all 4 key nodes at level 2 (  = HmSERT )  have
the same number o f  leaf nodes at level 3 (=  H M[N ST A), we arbitrarily choose key node 3, and
mark it as shown in Figure 6-3(a). Finally in step 4, we create a new key node, K18, and insert the
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marked key node and the new subtree consisting o f the new joining members, as its children in 
Figure 6-3(c). In this case, the GC needs to inform Ul and U2 that node ID 3 has shifted down 
one level to accommodate one new node. The update message therefore consists the old node ID, 
which is 3, and the new node ID, which is 7.
Figure 6-3: (a) ST_A key tree (8 members), (b) ST B key tree (2 members) and (c) resultant key tree 
Finally, there is an exception in Merging Algorithm 1. In cases where step 4 is used to find the 
insertion point, and H m x _ s t  a  ~  p  m i n  _ s t  _ a  ~ ^» K  MAXSTB — H m i n _ s t _ b  ~ 1 > aRJ when there is 
at least one leaf node at level H MAX ST A in the marked key node, then it can lead to a slightly
unbalanced key tree if ST_A and ST_B are combined using the above steps. One way to alleviate 
this issue is to delete the root in ST_B and split it into at most k subtrees. Order these new subtree 
by increasing order o f H MN. Starting from the subtree with the minimum height, insert it into 
ST_A using Merging Algorithm 1 and repeat until all new subtrees have been inserted into ST_A.
Figure 6-4 shows an example. In this example, we delete the root in ST_B (K9) and use step 4 
twice to insert the two new subtrees. Member U8 is inserted as the sibling o f U3 (see MARK!) 
and both members U6 and U7 are inserted as the siblings o f members U4 and U5 (see MARK2). 
In this case, the rekeying cost is slightly higher and 2 update messages are needed.
K8 I K4 | K11 
U2 | U3 I U8
[MARK!
I K5 K6 j K12 K13
I U4 U5 | U6 U7
i ..MARK2 i
Figure 6-4: (a) ST_A subtree (5 members), (b) ST B subtree (3 members) and (c) resultant key tree
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6.1.2 Merging Algorithm 2
We now describe our Merging Algorithm 2. This algorithm is only used for combining subtrees 
whose height difference is zero or equal to one.
The criteria for using Merging Algorithm 2 are when the difference between H MAX ST A and both 
H mn st b and H MAX ST B is zero or equal to one. The algorithm performs the following steps:
Step 1: For k > 2 , the algorithm searches the root o f  ST_A for empty child key node. If it exists,
the algorithm inserts ST B as the empty child key node.
Step 2: For k = 2 or when step 1 is not valid for k > 2 , the algorithm creates a new key node at
the root and inserts ST_A and ST_B as its children.
The GC needs to multicast at most one update message to all existing members. After updating 
the affected node IDs, the members can identify the set o f keys it needs in the rekey messages.
Figure 6-5 shows an example how Merging Algorithm 2 is used to combine two key trees 
together using Step 2. Since Merging Algorithm 2 creates a new node at the root, the GC needs to 
inform members UI to U8 about the node ID o f the old root has changed from 0 to 1.
Figure 6-5: (a) ST_A key tree (8 members), (b) ST B (4 members) key tree and (c) Resultant key tree
6.1.3 Batch Balanced Algorithm
We now show how our two Merging Algorithms can be extended to produce an algorithm that we 
call the Batch Balanced Algorithm that encompasses both joining and departing members.
There are six steps in our Batch Balanced Algorithm.
i. Identify and mark all key nodes that need to be updated. These key nodes are on the 
ancestors paths from each departing member to the root.
ii. Remove all marked key nodes. After removal, there are two types o f  element left: the 
remaining subtrees and joining members.
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iii. Classify all siblings o f  the departing members as joining members since all the KEKs 
they store cannot be used.
iv. Group the joining members into one or many subtrees each with k members. If there are 
remaining members left, they are grouped into another subtree o f between 2 to k -1  
members unless there is only one member left. If there is only one member left, treat it as 
a single-node subtree.
v. Starting from the subtree with the minimum height, compare it with another subtree with 
the next minimum height and if the Merging Algorithm 1 criteria are met, combine them 
using Merging Algorithm 1, else combine them using Merging Algorithm 2. Repeat this 
process until there is only one key tree.
vi. Construct the update and rekey messages and multicast to the members.
For clarity, we illustrate it with an example. Assume we have a balanced key tree with 16 
members. Suppose members U 11 and U 15 are departing from the group and 6 new members, U17 
to U22, are joining the group. All the key nodes in the path from the departing members to the 
root are marked and removed (step 1 and 2). The siblings o f departing members U12 and U16 
form a new subtree, ST7, since the KEKs they store are unusable (step 3). The joining members 
from one or more subtrees o f  k members (step 4). These usable subtrees, ST1 to ST7, are 
identified as shown in Figure 6-6.
Figure 6-6: Step 1 to Step 3 of Batch Balanced Algorithm
In step 5, we start with the minimum height subtrees and merge them. Thus, ST2 forms a subtree 
with ST3, ST4 forms a subtree with ST5 and ST6 forms a subtree with ST7. Then, the resultant 
subtree o f ST2 and ST3 is combined with the resultant subtree o f ST4 and ST5. This resultant 
subtree in turn forms another subtree with the resultant subtree o f ST6 and ST7. Finally, the last 
two subtrees form a single key tree as shown in Figure 6-7. The GC sends out the update 
messages to inform the members o f their new location. Those members that need to receive the 
update messages are members in ST2, ST3 and ST7, which means a total o f three update
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messages are needed. For ST4, ST5, and ST6, no update message is needed since the members in 
the subtrees are newly joining members. At the same time, the GC can multicast the rekey 
messages to the members. In this example, we assume that member U16 and subtree ST1 are left 
intact at their old location. If their locations are changed, 2 extra update messages are needed. The 
total rekeying cost is 20 messages.
K41
Update Messages Rekey Messages
11, 23 for U9 and U10 {K31}K35 {I<33}K3b {K41}Kt {K43}k45 {K45)kh
13, 24 for U13 and U14 {K31}k36 {K33}mo {K41}k« {K43}K46 {K45}Ki3
26,29 for U12 {K32W {K34)K26 {K42}K43 {K44}K33 {K46}K3,
{K32}K3o {K34}k3o {K42}k44 {K44}K34 {K46}K32
Figure 6-7: Resultant key tree for Batch Balanced Algorithm
If we use Marking Algorithm 1 for the insertion, it has the same rekeying cost as our Batch 
Balanced Algorithm but it ends up with an unbalanced key tree as illustrated in Figure 6-8. All 
departing members are first replaced by the joining members. Since there are remaining members 
left, one shallowest leaf node is chosen from these replacements (i.e., key node ID 25). This leaf 
node is removed and it forms new subtree with the remaining joining members. This new subtree 
is inserted at the old location o f the removed leaf node.
U13 U14 U18 U16
Rekey Messages
{K37)ki {K40}k42 {K44}k46 
{K37)k38 {K41 )k43 (K44}k34 
{K38}k39 {K41}k26 {K45}k35 
{K38}k40 {K42}k32 {K45}k36 
{K39}kh {K42}k3o {K46}K3i 
{K39}k41 {K43}k44 {K46}k33 
{K40}Ki3 {K43}k4S
U17 U19
Figure 6-8: Resultant key tree for Marking Algorithm 1
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Although Marking Algorithm 2 can maintain a balanced key tree, it needs 28 rekey messages as 
illustrated in Figure 6-9. All departing members are replaced by the joining members. The 
remaining joining members are inserted one by one with the leaf node o f the lowest node ID.
K37
{K37}k39 {K40)k«4 {K43}wa {K46}k3o {K49}K3s
{K38}k4o {K41}kh {K44}k49 {K47}kis {K50}«ib
{K38}k4 {K41)k45 {K44)kso {K47)K33 {K50)K38
{K39}k41 {K42}ki3 {K45}K3i {K48}k,0
{K39}k42 {K42}k46 {K45}k26 {K48}K34
Figure 6-9: Resultant key tree for Marking Algorithm 2
6.1.4 Update Messages
In order for the members to identify the keys they need after the key tree has been reorganised, the 
GC needs to inform the group members on their new location in the key tree. An update message 
consists o f the smallest node ID o f the usable key tree, m, and the new node ID, m ' . With the new 
node ID, m\the members can update the remaining keys, m0, using the following function:
f  ) = kx ( m m )  + mn
° 0 (6.1)
where x denotes the level o f the usable key tree.
For example, in Figure 6-10, the lowest node ID in the usable key tree, m, is 2 and the new 
smallest new node ID, m' , is 8. Each member just needs to insert the remaining node ID, mQ, 
they store into the above equation to obtain the new node ID.
K2 K2
C 2 ) C b ) x ~°
KZ^—------
( 7 ) ( 8  ) ( 9  ) I -  )  ( 2 5  ) ( 2 6  ) ( 2 7 )  x = 1
22 ) f 23 J f 24 J •••-  ( 2 8  ) ( 2 9  j ( 3 °  ) ( 7 6  J(77) ( 7 8  j ••-  ( 8 2  j ( 8 3  J ( 84 j  x  = 2
K22 K23 K24 K28 K29 K30 K22 K23 K24 K28 K29 K30
U1 U2 U3 U7 U8 U9 U1 U2 U3 U7 U8 U9
(a) (b)
Figure 6-10: (a) Usable and (b) New updated key tree
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6.2 Analysis
The performance o f the key tree approach depends on storage, computation and communication 
overhead. Following [94][95][96][97][98], we assume that the key tree investigated in this work is 
fully loaded and balanced with a height, h. All group members have equal probability o f 
departing. For ease o f analysis, we assume that all key trees are combined using Merging 
Algorithm 2 when the departing members is greater than zero.
In order for the GC to perform rekeying, it needs to store all the keys in the key tree; therefore its 
storage is [ (kN -1 )  /(/c -1)1 keys. The members, on the other hand, only need to store the keys on 
the ancestral path from their location in the key tree to the root, which means each member needs 
to store logA N + 1 keys.
6.2.1 Merging Algorithm Analysis
When there is no departing member, we can straightaway apply Merging Algorithm 1 or Merging 
Algorithm 2 depending on the number o f joining members. The worst rekeying cost for Merging 
Algorithm 1 occurs when the two subtrees are combined using step 4 since a new key node is 
created for insertion. All the KEKs from the root to level HINSERT are affected by the insertion. In 
other words, the number o f  affected key nodes, including the newly c^reated key is 
i_iogA A j-r io g *  j ~\ +1. In addition, we include the cost for constructing a subtree for the joining
members, k\(J -1 ) /(/c -1 )1 . Similarly, the worst rekeying cost for Merging Algorithm 2 occurs 
when the two subtrees are combined using step 2 since a new key node is created for insertion. 
The rekeying cost is simply the outdegree, k, for creating a new root plus the cost for constructing 
a new subtree for the joining members. Thus, the worst rekeying cost, RC, for batch join event is 
given by:
In the best case for the two Merging Algorithms, a new key node is not required and therefore the 
best rekeying cost is given by BEST RC = Worst RC -  k .
6.2.2 Batch Balanced Algorithm Worst Cast Analysis
For simplicity, we first assume that number o f departing members is some value D = kl for some 
integer /.
Worst RC,
*(Llog* N M  log, 71+1)+/+##! 
_ r  (fc-1)
Merging Algorithm 2
Merging Algorithm 1
(6.2)
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In the worst case, the departing members are spread evenly at the leaf nodes as shown in Figure 
6-11. This means (kl+{ — 1) /(A: — 1) key nodes at level 0 to level / cannot be reused. From level 
/ +1 to h -  2, there are D{k -1 )  usable subtrees at each level; in other words, the total number o f 
usable subtrees is D{k -1  )(h - 2 - 1 ) . At level h — 1, there are (k -1 ) siblings for each departing 
member, which means a total o f D ( k - 1) siblings. The worst update cost is 
D(k -1  )(h - 2  - l )  + D(k -1 ) .  Using our Batch Balanced Algorithm, all J joining members and 
D { k - 1) siblings o f the departing members form one or more subtrees with k members. Finally, 
all key trees form a single key tree. The rekeying cost is therefore given by:
Worst RC
k (D (k -\ ) (h -2 - l )  + [ D(<k 1) + J 1 -1 ) 
_________________ k
(jzo,d*0) k - 1
+ D(k -\ ) + J
(-k D ){k -\ ) + k [D k^- l) + J ) - k  + (D k -D  + J )(k -\ )
= KD( log, — ) + -------------------------------*---------------------------------------------
D k - 1
= KD(\ogk^ ) - D  + J +
k\D (k -\ ) + J 1 - k
k -1
(6.3)
Level 0
Figure 6-11: Worst case rekeying cost
Now suppose that we have D = kl + r  , where r lies between 0 and (k -1  )k‘ . The analysis is split
into two portions. For kl portion, the previous analysis still applies. As for r, 
— 3 — l)(Ar — 1) — 1] usable key trees are produced. The worst update cost is
k ' ( k - l ) ( h - 2 - l )  + r ( h - 3 - l ) ( k - l )  + (k' + r )(k -\ ) .  In addition, r(k - 1) siblings o f the r
departing members form one or more key trees with the siblings o f the k‘ departing members and 
joining members. The rekeying cost therefore becomes:
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Worst RC
k[k,(k-\)(h-2-l) + [{k +K^ k 1) + J 1 - 1 + r ( / t - 3 - / ) ( A : - l ) - r ]
k_______________________
(J>0,D*0) k — 1
+ (k' + r )(k -\ ) + J
j C t A r X * - ,! +
= ( i " l +rt)(logt - 7 ) + ------------------------  f c ' - r W  (6.4)
A: A - 1
6.2.3 Batch Balanced Algorithm Best Case Analysis
Again, we first assume that D = k‘ for some integer /.
In the best case, the number o f key nodes affected by the departing members is minimised, which 
means all the departing members will be concentrating on one area o f the key tree as shown in 
Figure 6-12. In this case, there are (& -1) usable subtrees in the affected branch from level
log, D0 to h — 2 and k-[kD/N~\ children o f  the root are not affected by the departing
members, where D0 lies between 0 and N Ik (D  = CN/k + D0) and C is between 0 to k. The
best update cost is (k -  \)(h -  2 -  log, D0) + k -[k D /  N1. All joining members form one or more 
subtrees with k members.
Level 0
Best RC(y>o,£>9tO)
Figure 6-12: Best case rekeying cost
J K D
i[(fc -  tx/. -  2 -  log, d 0) + r - i + -  r— i)  - 1)
__________________________ k_________ N_______
k -1 + J
(6.5)
Suppose we have D = k‘ + r  , where r lies between 0 and (k -  \)k'.
The same analysis still applies except that r produces another Y subtrees, where Y is the sum of 
the digit o f fy10®*7301 -  D0 when written in radix, k. In other words, the total number o f usable 
subtrees is (k - \)(h -  2 -  log, D0) + k -\kD I N~\ + Y . There are Dmodk siblings o f the
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departing members. Thefore the best update cost is
(/c-!)(/?  - 2 - log* D0)-t- k - [k D  / N~\ + Y + D modk . The Dmodk sibling o f the departing 
members and the joining members form one or more subtrees with k members.
m  -  m -  2  -  riogt d ; i>+ r '/ # m o- i + (*  - + y  -  d  { 6 .6 )
Best RC = _________________________________ £______________ &__________
+ J  + D  mod k
6.3 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we study the performance o f  our proposed algorithms and compared them with the 
Marking Algorithms described in [107] and [109], which we labelled them as Marking Algorithm 
1 and Marking Algorithm 2 respectively. We consider 4 performance metrics:
• rekeying cost;
• update cost;
• minimum and maximum height in the key tree;
• key storage.
The rekeying cost denotes the total number o f rekey messages that needs to be sent to all 
authorised group members in order for them to learn the new group key. A higher rekeying cost 
means more bandwidth is needed for the transmission. Although Marking Algorithm 2 adopts 
User-Oriented Key Assignment Algorithm (UKA) [109] where all the enciyptions for a member 
are assigned in a single packet, we ignore the UKA when we calculate the rekeying costs since it 
leads to significant number o f duplications in rekey messages. Instead, we just calculate the total 
number o f relcey messages that is needed without any duplication. The update cost denotes the 
total number o f update messages that needs to be sent to all affected members after the key tree 
has been reorganised in order for them to identify the keys they need. As for the minimum and 
maximum height, they affect the members’ key storage and thus the number o f decryptions 
needed by each member, and may even increases the rekeying costs too as explained in Chapter 5. 
Lastly, the key storage denotes the number o f keys each member need to store.
We ran our algorithms on a Linux terminal with 512MB RAM on 2GHz processor. To give an 
indication o f mn time, for a tree size o f 4096 members, mn times are typically in the range o f 1 to 
5 seconds and for a tree size o f  65536 members, run times are typically in the range o f 1 to 40 
seconds, both result being or up to approximately 2000 departing and joining members.
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6.3.1 Batch Join Performance Evaluation
We have performed some simulations to compare the performance o f  both our Merging 
Algorithms with existing work for batch join requests. We use Matlab to calculate the rekeying 
costs needed to insert the joining members into the key tree. For our simulation, we used a 
balanced binary key tree o f 256 members with height o f 8. The number o f joining members varies 
from 1 to 250. The rekeying costs for our Merging Algorithms are stated in Equation (6.2) 
whereas the rekeying cost for Marking Algorithm 1 is:
RC = kJ/(/c-1 )  + kLlog,. N]
(6.7)
and the rekeying cost for Marking Algorithm 2 is:
RC~ k[— f  ~ 1}~ 1] + k(loN-\ogt kJ +  \]fo r• / < + + +  (68)
k -1  k v '
6.3.1.1 Rekeying Cost
In Figure 6-13, we can see that Marking Algorithm 2 has the highest rekeying costs. This is 
because the joining members are inserted one by one at each leaf node, which affect the paths 
from the affected leaf nodes to the root. As the number o f joining members increases, the number 
o f affected nodes increases significantly. On the other hand, the other three algorithms have 
similar rekeying costs since they try to minimise the number o f affected nodes. Marking 
Algorithm 1 minimises the rekeying costs by placing the new key tree, which consists o f joining 
members and one removed member on the minimum height, at the old location o f the removed 
member. Hence only path from that leaf node to the root is affected regardless the number o f 
joining members. In other words, the rekeying cost consists o f the rekey messages that need to be 
multicast to the joining members and 2 logA. N  messages to update the keys from that affected
leaf node to the root o f the key tree. Merging Algorithm 1 inserts the new subtree, consisting o f  
the joining members, into one o f the key nodes in the key tree that depends on the number o f the 
joining members; thus, as the number o f joining members increases, the number o f affected nodes 
is reduced since key node selected for insertion get closer to the root. For Merging Algorithm 2, a 
new root is created with the existing subtree and the new suibtree, consisting o f the joining 
members, which are inserted as its children.
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Batch Join Performance Evaluation
Figure 6-13: Batch join rekeying costs
6.3.1.2 Update Cost
O f the four algorithms, only Marking Algorithm 2 does not need to distribute update messages to 
the members. Marking Algorithm 1 needs to send one update message to inform the removed leaf 
node o f its new location. Similarly, both Merging Algorithms needs to send out one update 
messages to inform the affected members o f the newly created node.
6.3.1.3 Minimum and Maximum Height
Figure 6-14 shows the maximum height o f the key tree after the joining members have been 
inserted into the key tree for all algorithms. Only Marking Algorithm 2 and Merging Algorithm 2 
maintain at a fixed height regardless the number o f joining members. Marking Algorithm 2 
alleviates the inefficiency in Marking Algorithm 1 by inserting the joining members one by one at 
each leaf node while Merging Algorithm 2 creates a new root and inserts the existing key tree and 
joining member key tree as its children. Merging Algorithm 1 has the same performance as 
Marking Algorithm 2 and Merging Algorithm 2 when the number o f joining members is less than 
or equal to half the group size. However, once the number o f joining members exceeds half the 
group size, the maximum height increases by one. This is why we set the criteria in the previous 
section because the selection o f the suitable key node is always at the child o f  the root once the 
joining members are greater than half the group size. In the case o f Marking Algorithm 1, the 
maximum height increases significantly as the number o f joining members increases, because all 
joining members form a new subtree with one member at the minimum height. This new key tree 
is inserted at the old location o f  the removed member’ s leaf node causing the maximum height to 
increase considerably.
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Figure 6-14: Maximum height in key tree
Figure 6-15 shows the maximum difference in height in the key tree, which indicates whether the 
key tree is balanced. The maximum difference in height for Marking Algorithm 1 increases 
considerably as the number o f joining members increases. Similarly, our Merging Algorithm 2 is 
not a balanced key tree when the number o f joining members is less than half the group size, it 
only maintains a balanced key tree when the number o f  joining members is greater than or equal 
to half the group size. This is why we set the criteria for Merging Algorithm 2 in the previous 
section. As for our Merging Algorithm 1, it maintains a balanced key tree when the number o f 
joining members is less than or equal to half the group size. The difference in height in Merging 
Algorithm 1 increases by one once the number o f joining members exceeds half the group size 
since the child o f the root is selected for insertion. Marking Algorithm 2 is the only algorithm, 
which creates a balanced key tree regardless o f the number o f joining members. However, all 
these come at the cost o f the huge rekeying costs as shown in Figure 6-13. On the other hand, if 
we can choose appropriately between both our Merging algorithms depending on the number o f 
joining members, we can create a balanced key tree without extra costs.
93
Chapter 6. Balanced Batch Rekeying Algorithms
Batch Join Performance Evaluation
Figure 6-15: Maximum difference in height in key tree
6.3.1.4 Key Storage
Table 2 shows the minimum and maximum number o f keys that the member needs to store for the 
four algorithms for batch join events. We can see the maximum number o f keys a joining member 
needs to store in Marking Algorithm 1 is dependent on the number o f joining members at that 
particular interval. A large number o f joining members result in a great difference in key storage 
among members. Marking Algorithm 2 does not suffer from the storage inefficiency as in 
Marking Algorithm 1, but it comes at the expense o f the large rekeying costs o f  Figure 6-13. Our 
Merging Algorithms can achieve the same efficiency in Marking Algorithms 2 if the Merging 
Algorithm is chosen appropriately depending on the number o f joining members.
Marking 
Algorithm 1
Marking 
Algorithm 2
Merging 
Algorithm 1
Merging 
Algorithm 2
Minimum key 
storage
Liog4w J Llog* (N + 7)J Llog*(AT + 7)J Liog*(w+y)J
Maximum key 
storage
riogtw +
log* (7 +  1)1
flog* (TV+ 7)1 riogt ( iv + j ) i flog* (JV + 7)1
Table 2: Minimum and maximum key storage for batch join events
6.3.2 Batch Balanced Algorithm
We built a simulator for our Batch Balanced Algorithm and Marking Algorithms using C++ in 
Linux environment in order to calculate the rekeying cost for the three algorithms. The general
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flow o f the simulator is shown in Figure 6-16. First, the simulator is initialised with an initial N  
members and outdegree o f  the key tree, k. The simulator then constructs a balanced key tree with 
N  members. There are three methods to select the departing members: best, worst and average 
case. For the best and worst case, the departing members are chosen accordingly to Figure 6-11 
and Figure 6-12. As for average case, the departing members are chosen using a random number 
generator that generates a random value from 1 to N. The joining members are inserted 
accordingly into the key tree depending on the algorithm. Finally, the rekeying costs are 
calculated. The above steps, except the initialisation step, are repeated until all the required values 
are recorded.
Figure 6-16: Flowchart of the simulator
6.3.2.1 Rekeying costs
To verify our analysis, we run the simulator that selects the departing members to give either the 
best or worst rekeying costs. We use a balanced key tree with 1024 members and the outdegree o f 
the key tree k - 2 .
Figure 6-17 shows the computed and simulated best and worst case rekeying costs for a binary 
key tree. Our analysis and simulated results match so well that we could not distinguish between 
the two. For the best case, the rekeying costs are not affected by the number o f departing 
members; rather they are purely based on the number o f joining members. This is because the 
number o f  affected nodes is minimised as the departing members are concentrated on one area o f 
the key tree in the best case. On the other hand, if the departing members are spread fairly on the
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key tree as in the worst case, it maximises the number o f affected nodes in the key tree. The 
highest rekeying cost occurs when the number o f departing members approaches half the group 
size, which means most or all the key nodes in the key tree cannot be used.
Computed and Simulated Best Rekeying Costs (k = 2) Computed and Simulated Worst Rekeylng Costs (k=2)
500
Joining Members 0 0
500
Departing Members
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500
Joining Members
500
Departing Members
(a) (b)
Figure 6-17: (a) Best and (b) Worst case rekeying costs for k = 2
Figure 6-18 shows the computed and simulated best and worst case rekeying costs for a key tree 
with k = 4 . Similar as the binary key tree, the best rekeying cost is purely dependent on the 
number o f joining members rather than the number o f departing members. However, for worst 
case, the highest rekeying cost happens when the number o f departing members is around N i k  .
Computed and Simulated Best Rekeying Costs (k=4) Computed and Simulated Worst Rekeying Costs (k=4)
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Figure 6-18: (a) Best and (b) Worst rekeying costs for k = 4
Generally, we can predict the rekeying costs for a key tree o f  any outdegree, k, if we are able to 
group the members accordingly to their departing probability since it is purely based on the 
number o f joining members rather than the number o f departing members. However, if the 
departing members are spread around as in the worst case, the highest rekeying cost happens at 
around N / k since most or all KEKs the member store cannot be used.
In order to compare the performance o f our Batch Balanced Algorithms with the Marking 
Algorithms [107][109], we run the simulator that give the typical case where the departing 
members are randomly picked, with all members have equal probability o f  departing, The
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rekeying costs are calculated as an average o f 100 simulation runs. We used a balanced key tree 
o f 1024 members with height o f  10 for a binary key tree. To analyse the effect o f our algorithm in 
case where k > 2 , we used a balanced key tree o f 4096 members with height o f  6 and k = 4 .
Figure 6-19 shows the rekeying costs for the three algorithms for k = 2 . Marking Algorithm 1 
and the Batch Balanced Algorithm have similar rekeying costs. Marking Algorithm 2 has twice 
the rekeying costs compared to Marking Algorithm 1 and Bach Balanced Algorithm when the 
number o f joining members approaches the group size and there are no departing members. 
Generally, Marking Algorithm 2 has the highest rekeying costs when the number o f joining 
members is greater than the number o f departing members.
Marking Algorithm 1 Rokoylng Costs (k=2) Marking Algorithm 2 Rokoylng Costs (k=2) Batch Balanced Algorithm Rokoylng Costs (k=2)
Joining Mombore 0 a Doparting Mombars Joining Members ® 9 Dopartlng Mombora Joining Members 0 ® Departing Members
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6-19: Rekeying costs for (a) Marking Algorithm 1 (b) Marking Algorithm 2 and (c) Batch
Balanced Algorithm
To investigate the rekeying costs in detail, we calculate the difference in the rekeying costs for the 
three algorithms as shown in Figure 6-20. For clarity, the y-axis o f Figure 6-20 (b) is reversed. All 
three algorithms have similar rekeying costs when the number o f joining members and the 
number o f departing members are comparable. Marking Algorithm 1 has highest rekeying costs 
compared to our Batch Balanced Algorithms when the number o f departing members approaches 
half the group size especially when there are no joining members. This is because most o f the key 
nodes in the key tree are affected by the departing members. By reorganising the remaining 
members in the key tree, we can reduce the rekeying costs. Replacing some o f the departing 
members with the joining members can help to diminish this effect for both Marking Algorithm 1 
and Marking Algorithm 2. We can see that Marking Algorithm 2 has highest rekeying costs 
compared to Marking Algorithm 1 and our Batch Balanced Algorithm when the number o f 
joining members is greater than the number of departing members. Another high cost in Marking 
Algorithm 2 is when the number o f departing members approaches half the group size. All these 
extra rekeying costs are resulted from the use o f the null nodes and the way Marking Algorithm 2 
inserts the joining members.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6-20: Difference in rekeying costs for k = 2
Figure 6-21 show the difference in rekeying costs for /c = 4 . As before, the y-axis for the 
difference in rekeying cost between Marking Algorithm 1 and our Batch Balanced Algorithm is 
reversed for clearer view. When the number o f  joining members and the number o f departing 
members are comparable, all three algorithms have similar rekeying costs. As before, Marking 
Algorithm 2 has two regions o f highest rekeying costs compared to Marking Algorithm 1 and our 
Batch Balanced Algorithm. The first occurs when the number o f joining members approaches the 
group size with no departing members. The other occurs when the number o f departing members 
is around N i k  with no joining members. Marking Algorithm 1 has the highest rekeying costs 
compared to the Batch Balanced Algorithm when the number o f departing members is in the 
region o f N i k  with no joining members. Replacing the departing members with the joining 
members helps to reduce the rekeying costs for both Marking Algorithm 1 and Marking 
Algorithm 2.
Difference hRokejrtng Costs (Marking Algorithm 1 - Botch Balanced Algorithm)
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6-21: Difference in rekeying costs for k -  4
6.3.2.2 Update Cost
For the Batch Balanced Algorithm, there are some overheads incurred since we reorganise the 
group members in the key tree. This requires the GC to send the update messages to inform the 
members o f their new location. It is important to note that the GC in Marking Algorithm 1 needs 
to multicast update messages to the members as well.
Figure 6-22 shows the total update messages that need to be sent to the remaining group members, 
including the siblings o f the departing members, in order for them to update their new key node
Oitforanco In Flekoying CostsfMarklng Algorithm 2 * Batch Balanced Algorithm)
"r-v
- ' '  T -
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ID. As expected, the update messages are purely dependent on the number o f departing members. 
The number o f update messages increases as the number o f departing members increases to 
around half the group size. This is because more key nodes in the key tree are affected by the 
departing members. However, once the number o f departing members exceeds half the group size, 
the number o f update messages decreases since there are fewer members left in the group.
If we assume that a key is 128 bits long and the node ID is 20 bits (i.e., up to 220 members), then 
a rekey message is at least 148 bits, excluding other overheads. An update message consists o f  the 
old node ID and the new node ID and ignoring overheads is therefore 40 bits long. In other words, 
a rekey message is 3.7 times the length o f an update message, thus the maximum update cost is 
equivalent to 109 rekey messages. In the next section, we show how we can reduce the number o f 
update messages needed by the group members for some rekey events.
Batch Balanced Algorithm Update Messages (k=2)
Joining Members ® 0 Departing Members
Figure 6-22: Update messages for Batch Balanced Algorithm (k — 2)
Figure 6-23 shows the total number o f update messages that need to be multicast to the members 
for k -  4 . We can see that there is a sharp increase in the update message compared with binary 
key tree. This is because for eveiy departing member, the GC needs to send 3 update messages to 
its siblings so that they can update the new location. The highest number o f  update messages 
occurs when the number o f  departing members is around N  / k .
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Batch Balanced Algorithm Update Messages (k=4)
Figure 6-23: Update messages for Batch Balanced Algorithm (k =  4)
6.3.2.3 Minimum and Maximum Height
Figure 6-24 shows the minimum and maximum height for Marking Algorithm 1, showing that a 
small percentage o f joining or departing members can increase the difference in height 
significantly. In the case where the number o f joining members is greater than the number o f 
departing members, only the maximum height is affected, while the minimum height is left 
unchanged and vice versa when the number o f departing members is greater than the number o f 
joining members. Marking Algorithm 1 can only maintain a balanced key tree when the number 
o f joining members is equal to the number o f departing members.
Marking Algorithm 1 Minimum Height (k=2) Marking Algorithm 1 Maximum Height (k=2)
Figure 6-24: (a) Minimum and (b) Maximum height in Marking Algorithm 1
Figure 6-25 shows the minimum and maximum height for Marking Algorithm 2. It can be seen 
that rapid increase in maximum height as in Marking Algorithm 1 is not visible in this case since 
the joining members are inserted one by one at each leaf node. As for the minimum height, 
Marking Algorithm 2 alleviates the inefficiency in Marking Algorithm 1 with the use o f the null 
node. However, one problem with Marking Algorithm 2 is that the key tree has now become a 
static key tree that can increases its minimum height to accommodate more joining members into
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the group but cannot decreases its minimum height with the departure o f  members since nodes 
that are not occupied are marked as null nodes. This causes unnecessary key storage and number 
o f encryptions 01* decryptions needed by the GC and group members. There is no way to 
overcome this issue unless the whole key tree is being rekeyed, which adds extra network costs.
Marking Algorithm 2 Minimum Height (k=2) Marking Algorithm 2 Maximum Height (k=2)
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Figure 6-25: (a) Minimum and (b) Maximum height in Marking Algorithm 2
Figure 6-26 shows the minimum and maximum height for Batch Balanced Algorithm. Regardless 
o f the number o f joining or departing members, both minimum and maximum height adapt to the 
changes in the group membership.
Batch Balanced Algorithm Minimum Height (k=2)
Joining Members 0 0 Departing Members
(a) (b)
Figure 6-26: (a) Minimum and (b) Maximum height in Batch Balanced Algorithm
We omit the minimum and maximum height performance for Marking Algorithm 1 and Marking 
Algorithm 2 for k — 4 , since the analysis described above is applicable.
Figure 6-27 shows the minimum and maximum height for Batch Balanced Algorithm for k = 4 . 
Both minimum and maximum heights have similar output. Since the single key tree is formed 
using bottom-up method, some o f the root’ s child key nodes might be less than k in some case, 
which results in one extra level in the minimum and maximum height.
Batch Balanced Algorithm Maximum Height (k=2)
Joining Members
500
Departing Members
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Batch Balanced Algorithm Minimum Height (k=4) Batch Balanced Algorithm Maximum Height (k=4)
Figure 6-27: (a) Minimum and (b) Maximum height in Batch Balanced Algorithm
6.3.2.4 Key Storage
Table 3 shows the minimum and maximum key storage for the three algorithms. Since a full 
calculation for key storage o f Marking Algorithm 1 is complex, we have assumed a balanced key 
tree when we calculate its maximum and minimum storage. The maximum key storage in 
Marking Algorithm 1 then depends on the number o f joining and departing members at that 
particular interval. For Marking Algorithm 2, the member needs additional key storage since the 
minimum and maximum key storage values are dependent on the maximum group size ever 
reached, NMAX , regardless o f the current group size. The Batch Balanced Algorithm has lower 
maximum key storage than either Marking Algorithm 1 or Marking Algorithm 2.
Marking 
Algorithm 1
Marking 
Algorithm 2
Batch Balanced 
Algorithm
Minimum key 
storage
LiogfcWJ Li°gftW «*)J Llogt (JV+ ./-£ > ) J
Maximum key 
storage
llogA (77) j  + 
Hog* ( ./-£ > +  1)]
ri°gto v « « ) i riog*(AT + y -D )1
Table 3: Minimum and maximum key storage for batch join and/or depart events
6.4 Discussion
6.4.1 Optimisation
From the above simulation, we observe that Batch Balanced Algorithm has identical rekeying 
costs compared to existing algorithms when the number o f joining members and the number o f
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departing members are comparable. Therefore, one optimisation which we can apply to our Batch 
Balanced Algorithm is not to reorganise the members in the key tree for the following condition:
D < J  < ( D - D  . )  + /{£> .V m m / mm
where Dmill is number o f departing members at minimum height.
(6.9)
For case where J is equal to D, we replace all D  depart by J  join. If J is greater than D  and 
provided that J is smaller or equal to [(D - Dmin) + kDmin] , we replace all (D -D min) departing
members at the maximum height with (D -D mjn) joining members. The remaining joining
members are split across the Dmin nodes. We illustrate it with an example. Suppose in Figure
6-28(a), member U3, U6 and U7 wish to depart and U8 to U12 wish to join the group, ./must lies 
between 3 to 5 in order to fulfil the above condition. The resultant key tree is shown in Figure 
6-28(b).
(a) (b)
Figure 6-28: (a) Key tree with join and depart requests and the (b) resultant key tree
Figure 6-29 shows the update messages for our optimised Batch Balanced Algorithms. We can 
see that there are some cases where no update message is needed since there is no reorganisation 
o f the member in the group. The rekeying costs still remain the same as shown in Figure 6-19. 
There is no way to maintain a balanced key tree without reorganising the key tree when the 
number o f departing members is greater than the number o f joining members.
Optimised Batch Balanced Algorithm Members Updating Messages (k=2)
500
Joining Members
500
Departing Members
Figure 6-29: Update message for Optimised Batch Balanced Algorithm (k = 2)
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6.4.2 Simulation Results Analysis
Even though our Merging Algorithms and Batch Balanced Algorithm have comparable rekeying 
costs compared to Marking Algorithm 1, our proposed schemes outperform Marking Algorithm 1 
in other performance metrics such as height in the key tree and maximum key storage needed by 
the members. Compared with Marking Algorithms 2, our proposed schemes achieve better 
performance in term o f rekeying costs, height in the key tree and key storage needed by the 
members. This is because the way Marking Algorithm 2 inserts the joining members one by one 
at each leaf node which affects a lot o f  key nodes. Furthermore, the use o f null nodes in the key 
tree makes it a static key tree that can increase its height to accommodate more joining members 
but not decrease its height with the departure o f the members. However, we need to distribute 
update messages to the members to inform them o f their new location for our proposed schemes.
6.4.3 Application Scenarios
Based on our simulation results, we now make some recommendation on the various applications 
where our Batch Balanced Algorithm can outperform existing work. Our recommendations are 
based on application requirement, operation environments and expected group membership 
behaviour.
• Satellite pay-per-view TV distribution
For this type o f scenario, generally, the number o f joining members is greater than the number 
o f  departing members at the beginning o f the multicast session. During the session, the 
number o f joining members and number o f departing members might be comparable. Finally, 
the number o f departing members is greater than the number o f joining members at the end o f 
the session. In this case, our Batch Balanced Algorithm can overcome the inefficiency in 
Marking Algorithm 1 and Marking Algorithm 2 at the beginning and end o f the session. 
During the session, the rekeying costs for the three algorithms are expected to be similar.
• Group-oriented mobile commerce [7][ 126]
Generally, mobile devices have limited storage and computation [126][127]. In this case, it 
might be better to minimise the number o f keys they need to store and the number o f 
decryptions during each batch. By reducing the number o f decryptions needed, we can help to 
conserve the battery power too. Furthermore, the energy consumption o f decryption is 30% 
more than enciyption [127]. In this type o f scenario, our Batch Balanced Algorithm has better 
performance compared to both Marking Algorithm since its minimum and maximum height 
adapt to the changes in the group membership. In addition, its rekeying cost is lower than or 
similar compared to existing algorithms. This is crucial, especially in wireless multicast
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scenario, since the bandwidth is limited and data typically experience a higher transmission 
error rate than in conventional environments [120][121].
• Multicast session with long duration
There is usually at least one peak and one non-peak period for this type o f scenario. If 
Marking Algorithm 2 is used for this type o f scenario, additional rekeying costs are needed 
during the off-peak period since the minimum and maximum height o f  the key tree maintains 
at the same level as in the peak period. Furthermore, there are additional key storage and 
encryption/decryption requirements for both GC and group members. As for Marking 
Algorithm 1, the probability o f the key tree becoming unbalanced is very high [111], which 
can results in higher decryption for some o f the members.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented two Merging Algorithms which are suitable for batch join 
events. To handle other events such as depart or both depart and join request, we have extended 
these two Merging Algorithms into a Batch Balanced Algorithm. All three algorithms try to 
minimise the difference in height in the key tree without adding extra network costs. However, all 
the algorithms require the GC needs to update the members on their node position using update 
messages. By minimising the difference in height, we minimise the number o f key storage and 
decryptions needed by each member. This is critical for mobile devices with limited computation 
power and storage. Furthermore, reducing the number o f decryptions can help to reduce the 
energy consumption, which leads to battery saving.
For batch join events, the way the joining members are inserted into the key tree has significant 
effects on the key tree especially when there is large number o f  join requests in batch. The key 
tree can become unbalanced even if the insertion is at the minimum height. Existing algorithms do 
not simultaneously consider both the balance o f the key tree and rekeying costs, and therefore 
lead to either an unbalanced key tree or high rekeying costs. Our proposed Merging Algorithms 
provide a good compromise compared to existing algorithms, producing a balanced key tree with 
low rekeying costs. For both Merging Algorithms, the GC only needs to multicast at most one 
update message to infonn the affected members. Compared to a rekey message, the size o f an 
update message is several times smaller since it consists o f the old node ID and new node ID.
As for other events, our Batch Balanced Algorithm outperforms existing algorithms when the 
number o f joining members is greater than the number o f departing members and when the 
number o f departing members is around N / k with no joining members. However, our algorithm 
requires the GC to distribute the update messages to the members. For similar numbers o f  joining
105
Chapter 6. Balanced Batch Rekeying Algorithms
and departing members, our Batch Balanced Algorithm achieves the same performance as to 
existing algorithms. We also observe that if we are able to group the members according to their 
departing probability, we are able to predict the rekeying costs based on the number o f joining 
members. However, if the departing members are spread evenly across the key tree, the highest 
rekeying costs happen at around N ik  since all the KEKs the members store cannot be used.
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Chapter 7
7 Distributed Group Key Management 
Architecture
To avoid performance bottleneck and single point o f failure problems, a distributed architecture 
that partitions the group members into several areas is preferred over centralised design. The 
partition o f the group members into areas may be done on either a physical or logical basis. 
Usually, they are partitioned on physical basis; therefore the member movement within an area 
does not require any rekeying. Mobility adds another dimension o f complexity to the design o f 
distributed group key management scheme by allowing members not only to join or depart the 
group but also transfer between areas in wireless environment [124] as shown in Figure 7-1.
DGC - Domain Group Controller 
AGC - Area Group Controller
Figure 7-1: Group Key Management Architecture
Existing schemes either perform rekeying immediately or periodically when a mobile member 
transfers between areas, which in turn generate a lot o f unnecessary rekeying messages. However, 
we observe that allowing a mobile member to hold more than one set o f valid keys while it is in 
the multicast group does not compromise the strict secrecy requirement as long as all the keys it 
possesses are updated when it finally departs the multicast group.
In this work, we have proposed a Member Consolidation Delayed Rekeying (MCDR) scheme, 
which considers member mobility between areas. MCDR adopts the architecture as illustrated in 
Figure 7-1. All members belong to a domain managed by a Domain Group Controller (DGC). The
107
Chapter 7. Distributed Group Key Management Architecture
domain is divided into several areas, each managed by an Area Group Controller (AGC) within it. 
During the multicast session, the DGC is responsible for generating the group key and distributes 
it to all AGCs. Each AGC can use any scalable algorithms to distribute the group key to the 
members in their area.
In addition, MCDR tries to minimise the rekeying cost when a static member or mobile member 
joins the group in an area. This is achieved by consolidating the joining members and rekeying 
them in a batch. Doing so allows our MCDR to achieve the efficiency close to batch rekeying but 
does not compromise the strict secrecy requirement.
7.1 Constraint
Before we proceed further, we list the constraint. In this work, we focus on strict security. This 
means no member can deciypt the multicast data unless it is currently a member o f the multicast 
group. Specifically, the following constraints are enforced.
• Backward Secrecy: When a member joins the multicast group, the group key must be 
changed to ensure that the new member cannot decode any previously transmitted 
multicast data.
• Forward Secrecy: When a member departs the multicast group, the group key must be 
changed to ensure that the departing member cannot decode future data transmissions.
In order to meet the above requirements, a rekeying operation should be triggered after each join 
or depart event. It consists o f  generating a new group key or TEK and distributing it to the 
members including the joining member in case o f a join event or to all remaining members in case 
o f a depart event.
7.2 Member Consolidation Delayed Rekeying (MCDR)
We can use MCDR to minimise the rekeying costs when a static or mobile member joins the 
group in an area and when a mobile member transfers between areas. MCDR employs three lists: 
Pending List (PL), Removing List (RL) and Mobility List (ML). Both PL and RL are managed by 
the AGC in each area and the ML is managed by the DGC. The PL o f area i, denoted by PLi ,
contains the members who are currently in area i but did not possess KEKs. whereas the RL o f
area i, denoted by RL., contains the members who possess KEKs; and are currently in the
multicast group but not in area i. Both PL and RL are maintained by the AGC. As for the ML, it 
contains those members that have transferred between areas and hold valid keys in other areas. 
This ML is maintained by the DGC. We first assume that all three lists are empty.
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When a member, u, wishes to join the multicast group, it sends a join request to the AGC in the 
area, AGC,.. The AGC(. first authenticates u to make sure that it is an authorised member. Once
authenticated, the AGC,. digital signed a credential and hands it to u. The credential contains
Member ID, Expiration Time, Multicast Group ID. At the same time, the AGC,. informs the DGC
about the join event and the DGC generates a new TEK, TEK', and distributes it to all AGCs to 
maintain backward secrecy. All AGCs encrypt TEK with the old TEK and multicast it to the 
existing group members in their own areas. In addition, the AGC. places u on the PL. and 
transmits the TEK', which is encrypted with the individual key o f u, to u.
When a member, u, wishes to depart from the multicast group, it sends a depart request to the 
AGC in the area, AGC,.. The AGC,. informs the DC about the depart event and the DGC
generates a new TEK and distributes it to all AGCs. The AGC,. also generates new KEKs,. for
area i and distributes them using the depart procedure to maintain backward secrecy. After the 
new KEKs are in place, the new TEK is distributed to the remaining member in the area. All the 
other AGCs encrypt TEK' with the old TEK and multicast it to their respective group members.
In wireless environment, we observe that allowing a mobile member to hold more than one set o f 
valid keys while it is in the multicast group does not compromise the strict secrecy requirement as 
long as all the keys it possesses are updated when it finally departs the multicast group. Thus 
when a mobile member, u, wishes to transfer from area i to area j ,  it first initiates the transfer by 
notifying the AGC in the old area, AGC,., and the AGC in the new area, AGC j . In addition, u
also presents the credential, which it received when it first joined the group, to the A G C.. If u has 
been in area j  before and is on RLj, the AGCy. puts it back onto its previous position and 
removes it from RLj. In addition, the AGC; updates u on those set o f KEKs that has been 
changed when u is not in the area j  (i.e., those set o f  KEKs that have changed during a join or 
depart event when u is not in area j). If u is not on RL., the AGCy puts u on PL . . Meanwhile if u
is on PLt in area i, the AGC. removes it from the PLt . If not, the AGC,. put u on RLt . As there 
is no change in group membership in the multicast group, no rekeying is needed in both areas. 
Although the TEK does not need to be changed, the AGC. still needs to inform the DGC about
the relocation o f u so that the DGC can update the ML. This allows the DGC to keep track o f the 
members’ mobility within the multicast group.
All members that are on PL. , uP[ , will hold valid KEKs,. o f area i on two conditions. The first 
one occurs when there is a depart event. The second one is when the total number o f members in
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P f  reaches a threshold, T. For the former condition, uPL need to possess the KEKs(. in order for 
them to obtain the new TEK. As for the latter, this is to prevent the high rekeying costs as in the 
pair-wise approach [75][76] when one members on PLt departs from area i. Delaying the
rekeying for uPL does not affect any member since all o f  them still possess the TEK that are used
to encrypt the multicast data stream. In this way, we can reduce the number o f rekeying 
operations and rekeying cost by consolidating all transferring members, which has the same 
performance as batch rekeying. However, we did not compromise security for performance as in 
batch rekeying and we like to note that batch rekeying does not fulfil our strict secrecy 
requirement. Placement o f  the joining members is important since proper placement can further 
reduce the rekeying costs as discussed in Chapter 6. Without loss o f generality, since each AGC 
can adopt any group key management algorithm, we assume a suitable location that minimises the 
rekeying cost is chosen to insert the member in PL.
Assume that a depart event happens in area i, the AGC(. informs the DGC about the depart event 
and the DGC distributes the newly generated TEK, TEK', to all AGCs. If the PLt is empty, the 
AGC,. performs the rekeying as mentioned above. If not, the AGCf first replaces the departing 
member with one o f the member in uPL . Then the remaining members in uPL are inserted 
accordingly in a batch. For other AGCs AGC; , j * i ,  they just encrypt TEK' with the old TEK 
for the members. For the insertion above, the AGC. needs to check that the keyset o f any 
members in PL. , </>. ,  does not affect the keyset o f any member in RL, (j) . , totally. If
UPLl uRlt
, u*RLj is removed from the RL. No rekeying is needed for uRL/ since all KEKs it held
have been changed. Thus, a member is removed from the RL not only when it departs from the 
multicast group, but also when other members who share the same set o f KEKs depart from the 
multicast group. The join and depart process o f  member u are shown in Figure 7-2 and the 
transfer in and transfer out process o f  member u are shown in Figure 7-3.
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(a) (b)
Figure 7-2: (a) Join and (b) Depart process for member u
(a) (b)
Figure 7-3: (a) Transfer in and (b) Transfer out process for member u
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7.3 Comparison
Table 4 presents the features o f  the three schemes (Immediate Rekeying (IR)[122][123][124], 
First Entry Delayed + Periodic (FEDRP)[122][123][124] and MCDR) which consider member 
mobility between different AGCs.
All schemes did not specify any group key management, thus each AGC can adopt scalable group 
key management algorithm. All schemes suffer from “ 1 affects N”  scalability problem [115], 
where the action o f one member affects all the group members. This is because most schemes try 
to avoid changing the group key (TEK) when a member transfers between areas. This is 
advantageous for multicast group where the members transfer between areas frequently. For a 
join event, IR and FEDRP require some o f the KEKs and the TEK to be changed whereas MCDR 
only needs to distribute the new TEK to all existing members and the joining member. As for 
depart event, all schemes have to change the KEKs and TEK.
Among the three schemes, only IR requires rekeying in both areas where a member transfers in 
and out o f  an area. This is because it only allows a member to hold valid KEKs in the area where 
it currently resides. For FEDRP, no rekeying is needed for transfer out event and the KEKs held 
by the transferred mobile member will be reset when it departs the group or when the FEDRP 
timer expires. Rekeying may be needed if the member is transferred in for the first time for 
FEDRP. As for MCDR, no rekeying is needed for both transfers in or out event. The KEKs held 
by the mobile member becomes invalid when it departs from the group or all KEKs it held have 
been changed. For transfer in event, the mobile member is put on the PL. However, for any 
transfer event, the group key does not need to be changed for the three schemes.
Immediate Rekey 
(IR)
First Entry Delayed + 
Periodic (FEDRP)
Member 
Consolidation 
Delayed Rekeying 
Scheme (MCDR)
Specified Group 
Key Management 
Algorithm needed
No No No
“ 1 affects A ” 
scalability problem
Yes Yes Yes
Member joins the 
the area
KEKs and TEK 
need to be changed
KEKs and TEK need to 
be changed
TEK needs to be 
changed but KEKs do 
not need to be
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changed.
Member departs 
the the area
KEKs and TEK 
need to be changed
KEKs and TEK need to 
be changed
KEKs and TEK need 
to be changed
Member u 
transfers between 
areas - Change of 
TEK for the group
No No No
Member u 
transfers between 
areas - Change of 
KEKs in the old -  
area
Yes No. The KEKs held by 
u become invalid when 
u departs or the FEDRP 
timer expires.
No. The KEKs held by 
u become invalid when 
a departs from the area 
or all KEKs held by u 
have been changed
Member transfers 
between areas - 
Change of KEKs in
the new areas
................ ................
Yes
Depends. If u is 
entering the area for the 
first time, rekeying is 
needed
No
Table 4: Features for IR, FEDRP and MCDR
7.4 Simulation Results
In this section, we study the performance o f our MCDR compared to existing schemes. For 
simplicity, we adopt LKH for all three schemes (i.e. IR, FEDRP and MCDR) since we want to 
minimise the number o f computations at the member side and the main performance metric we 
evaluate is the rekeying cost. For both simulations, we used a balanced binary key tree with 1024 
members.
For the first simulation, we investigate the saving in rekeying costs when we consolidate the 
joining members and rekey them in a batch using Matlab. The number o f joining members varies 
from 1 to 40 and there is no departing member. We assume that Merging Algorithm 1 is used to 
insert the members on the PL into the key tree for our MCDR. We sum up all the rekeying costs 
in each join event for IR/FEDRP (i.e. 2Jr(logjt N ) ). As for MCDR, the rekeying cost consists o f
the total number o f rekey messages that need to be sent to the existing members in the key tree 
and the members in the PL when a member joins the group (i.e. 2J) and the total number o f rekey 
messages for inserting the members in PL into the key tree (i.e. Refer to Equation (6.2)) where J 
is the total number o f joining members. Figure 7-4 illustrates the rekeying costs for IR/FEDRP
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and MCDR for a sequence o f join event. It can be seen that even for small group o f joining 
members (e.g. around 10 joining members), the saving in rekeying costs is reduced by at least half 
if we consolidate them on the PL and rekey them in a batch.
Figure 7-4: Rekeying costs for IR/FEDRP and MCDR for the join event
For our second simulation, we create a scenario using C++ where there is a sequence o f join, 
depart, transfer in and out events in an area. The three algorithms perform the appropriate 
rekeying depending on the specific event. The total duration o f the multicast session lasts 500 
seconds. To minimise the extra rekeying costs in FEDRP, we skip the FEDRP timer.
Figure 7-5 shows the rekeying costs for the three schemes. The AGC in IR needs to perform 
rekeying for all the events. Generally, the rekeying cost for any event is around 20 messages. As 
for FEDRP, the AGC does not need to perform rekeying when a mobile member transfers out o f 
the area or when a mobile member who holds valid KEKs transfers into the area. However, the 
rekeying costs can be quite significant when a mobile member who holds valid KEKs in the area 
departs from the group as shown in Figure 7-5(b) (i.e. around 300 and 450 seconds). This is 
because all members that are on the FEDRP list are removed when one member departs from the 
group. Generally, the number o f rekeying operations needed by FEDRP for the multicast duration 
is lower compared to IR (i.e. around 100 and 400 seconds). In the case o f  our MCDR, it can be 
seen that there are a number o f  situations where only two rekeying messages are needed. 
Although inserting the members in PL in a batch requires a slightly higher rekeying cost 
compared to a join or depart event in IR, the saving in rekeying cost can be quite significant if we 
sum up the rekeying cost.
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Figure 7-5: Rekeying costs for (a) IR, (b) FEDRP and (c) MCDR for a sequences of join
transfer in and out event
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The cumulative rekeying costs for IR, FEDRP and MCDR are illustrated in Figure 7-6. It can be 
both IR and FEDRP require more than twice the rekeying costs needed by MCDR for the whole 
multicast duration.
Figure 7-6: Cumulative rekeying costs for IR, FEDRP and MCDR
7.5 Summary
To avoid performance bottleneck and single point o f failure problems, a distributed architecture 
that partitions the group members into several areas is preferred over centralised design. However, 
mobility adds another dimension o f complexity to the design o f distributed key management 
scheme by allowing members not only to join or depart the group but also transfer between areas 
in wireless environment.
Existing schemes either perform rekeying immediately or periodically when a mobile member 
transfers between areas, which in turn generate a lot o f unnecessary rekeying messages. In this 
work, we have proposed a Member Consolidation Delayed Rekeying (MCDR) that tries to 
minimise the rekeying cost when a member joins the group in an area and when a mobile member 
transfers between areas. To achieve that, we make use o f  two lists in an area, Pending List (PL) 
and Removing List (RL), and one list for the whole group, Mobility List (ML). The PL contains 
o f an area contains the members who are currently in that area but do not possess the valid KEKs 
and the RL o f an area contains the members who possess the valid KEKs in the area but currently 
not in that area. The ML is used to track the member mobility so that the DGC needs to inform 
affected AGCs when a mobile member departs from the group instead o f  all AGCs.
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When a member joins the area, MCDR only needs to change the TEK and then it put the member 
on the PL. Similarly, those mobile members that are entering the area for the first time are put on 
the PL too. However, no rekeying is needed since they have the current TEK. All these members 
are consolidated until there is a depart event or the number o f members in PL reaches a threshold, 
T. Simulation result shows that even for small group o f joining members (e.g. around 10 joining 
members), the saving in rekeying costs is reduced by at least half if we consolidate them on the 
PL and rekey them in a batch.
In the case where there is a sequence o f join, depart, transfer in and out event, we can see a 
significant saving in rekeying cost in MCDR compared to existing schemes. This is partly due to 
the consolidation o f the members and we also do not remove all the mobile members in the RL 
when one member in RL departs from the group. We believe allowing a mobile member to hold 
more than one set o f valid keys while it is in the multicast group does not compromise the strict 
secrecy requirement as long as all the keys it possesses are updated when it finally departs the 
multicast group.
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8.1 Conclusion
IP multicast is a promising communication model for group oriented applications. Unfortunately, 
the strength o f multicast is also its security weakness; the anonymous receiver model in multicast 
is based on a single multicast address, rather than explicitly listing the members, allows multicast 
to scale to virtually any group size. This complicates confidentiality which requires individual and 
explicit identification o f the members in order to make sure that only legitimate members are able 
to access the multicast data stream. In this thesis, we concentrate on one o f the main areas in 
multicast security -  multicast data confidentiality.
In secure multicast communications, the multicast data stream are encrypted by the sender before 
they are sent out using a group key and this group key is distributed to all authorised members by 
a trusted entity known as the Group Controller (GC). As the group membership might be 
dynamic, this group key must be changed to provide both forward and backward secrecy. In other 
words, the group key is only known to those members that are authorised to decrypt the data 
stream. To avoid overwhelming the GC that is managing a large group, the GC makes use o f 
auxiliary keys to provide a scalable rekeying operation. One o f the most popular schemes is the 
key tree approach. In this approach, each member is assigned a set o f keys based on its location in 
the key tree. The rekeying cost o f  the key tree approach increases with the logarithm o f the group 
size for a join or depart request. In addition to the rekeying cost, another performance metric that 
should be taken into consideration are the storage need by both the GC and group members.
The main achievements o f the research are summarised below.
1. Scalable Hierarchical Group Key Management Algorithm
For individual rekeying, we focus on the efficiency o f the key tree approach (i.e., the balance o f 
the key tree). We have proposed an algorithm, which we referred to as Multi-Layers Logical Key 
Hierarchy (MLB-LKH) that considers several related multicast sessions as a whole to minimise 
the rekeying cost and key storage needed by the GC and members. For our simulation using 
multicast video encoded with 4 cumulative layers, we observe the key storage needed by both GC 
and members’ side is reduced by at least half compared to the traditional approach where each
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multicast session is considered separately. Similarly, the rekeying cost is reduced by at least half 
compared to the traditional approach if the member joins or departs from layer 2. There are two 
issues at the receivers’ side during rekeying regardless o f whether the multicast data stream are 
halted or continue to flow. Halting the data streams add waiting latency which may affect real­
time applications such as video streaming. On the other hand, if the data streams continue to flow 
during rekeying, it causes buffering problem for members with limited storage since they need to 
buffer all packets before they can be decrypted. To alleviate the above issues, we proposed two 
optimisation techniques to enhance our MLB-LKH. The first one is to reduce the number o f 
rekeying operations when a member switches between Service Group (SG), where the data group 
keys in the old SG are a proper subset o f the data group keys in the new SG. The GC just needs to 
generate a new data group key for the new SG and distribute it to the existing members in that SG 
and the joining member. The second optimisation allows the members to receive the affected data 
group keys quickly. This is achieved by allowing the members to perform one way function on 
the data group key in the highest affected layer to get the data group keys in the lower layer. As 
for the auxiliary keys, the members can take its time to decrypt the rekey messages while 
receiving the data streams at the same time.
2. Balanced Batch Rekeying Algorithms
For batch rekeying, we have discussed how we can maintain the balance o f the key tree over time 
when members join and/or depart from the multicast session. We have proposed two Merging 
Algorithms suitable for batch join events for combining subtrees together. These two Merging 
Algorithms not only balanced the key tree but have lower rekeying costs compared to existing 
algorithms. In other words, our Merging Algorithms allow all members in the multicast session to 
have similar storage and decryption requirements during each rekeying operation. Having a 
balanced key tree greatly benefits mobile devices since they generally have limited storage and 
computation power; reducing the number o f decryptions needed by the mobile device can help to 
conserve the battery power. In order to additionally handle departing members, we extend these 
two Merging Algorithms into a Batch Balanced Algorithm where the tree height adapts to the 
change in the group membership. However, this requires reorganisation o f the group members in 
the key tree. Simulation results show that our Batch Balanced Algorithm performs significantly 
better than existing algorithms when the number o f joining members is greater than the number o f 
departing members and when the number o f departing members is around N ik  with no joining 
members where N  is the total number o f group members and k is the outdegree o f  the key tree. 
For similar number o f joining and departing members, out Batch Balanced Algorithm achieves 
the same performance as existing algorithms.
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3. Distributed Group Key Management Architecture
To avoid performance bottleneck and single point o f failure problems, a distributed architecture 
that partitions the group members into several areas is preferred over centralised design. Mobility 
adds another dimension o f complexity to the design o f distributed architecture scheme by 
allowing members not only to join or depart the group but also transfer between areas. We have 
proposed one algorithm, which we referred to as Member Consolidation Delayed Rekeying 
(MCDR) that tries to minimise the rekeying cost when member transfers areas. To achieve that, 
MCDR makes use o f three lists: Pending List (PL), Removing List (RL), and Mobility List (ML). 
In contrast to existing schemes where auxiliary keys are distributed to the joining member or 
when the mobile member that are entering the area for the first time, MCDR consolidate these 
joining members and mobile members on the PL and rekey them in a batch. Doing so allows 
MCDR to achieve the efficiency close to batch rekeying without trading-off any security for that. 
Simulation result shows that even for small group o f joining members (e.g. around 10 joining 
members), the saving in rekeying costs is reduced by at least half if we consolidate them on the 
PL and rekey them in a batch. In situations where there is a sequence o f join, depart, transfer in 
and out event, we can see a significant saving in rekeying cost in MCDR compared to existing 
schemes. This is partly due to the consolidation o f the members and we also do not remove all 
mobile members from the RL when one member in RL departs from the group. We believe 
allowing a mobile member to hold more than one set o f valid keys while it is in the multicast 
group does not compromise the strict secrecy requirement as long as all the keys it possesses are 
updated when it finally departs the multicast group.
8.2 Future W ork
This section describes some o f the issues which remain to be tackled.
In our distributed design, we have assumed that the Area Group Controller (AGC) in each area is 
fixed. However, there are possibilities that the AGC themselves are mobile, and that may result in 
members in an area out o f  reach o f an AGC. In that case, the AGC may select a new AGC, or the 
members may elect an AGC. Another issue that needs to be addressed is if there are failures in 
one o f the AGCs, how can we recover from the failures without having to re-initialise the entire 
group in the area?
In addition to end-to-end security (i.e. group key management), there are also security issues at 
the infrastructure as shown in Figure 8-1.
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Figure 8-1: Multicast security infrastructure problem
8.2.1 Receiver Access Control in Edge Network
When a host wishes to join a particular multicast group as a receiver, control messages 
(Query/Report messages) are exchanged between the receiver and the edge multicast router. If the 
Report messages are unsecured, an illegal host can send bogus subscriptions that generate the 
following:
• Wastage in resources (processing and memory) within the affected routers (i.e., risk o f 
DoS attacks) as well as unnecessary extensions o f the distribution tree toward the 
networks where there are no legitimate hosts.
• Excessive bandwidth consumption in the subnet o f the attacker, as fake Report messages 
open vulnerabilities to multicast traffic overload and potential risk for DoS attacks in the 
attacker’ s subnet.
Unfortunately, traffic encryption does not solve the problem since a malicious host can still 
generate DoS attacks even if it cannot decrypt the multicast traffic. To face such attacks, the 
receiver needs to prove its membership right to a multicast router (e.g., MLD/IGMP router).
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8.2.2 Sender Access Control in Edge Network
In the case o f the sender access control, its aim is to prevent unauthorised hosts from sending 
bogus multicast traffic. This problem is particularly challenging for Any Source Multicast (ASM)
[1] since any member are allowed to send its multicast traffic without prior request to the 
multicast router. It is because the designated routers do not maintain state information about the 
senders. Therefore, an attacker may send bogus multicast traffic to the groups, and hence create 
DoS attacks. Although these packets can be discarded by the receivers using a source 
authentication mechanism, these bogus packets will still generate traffic overhead over the scope 
o f the multicast group. In addition, Source Filtering mechanisms provided by the Source-Specific 
Multicast (SSM) [128] , the Reverse Path Forwarding (RPF) check [129] and other source 
filtering approaches [130][131] do not efficiently resolve the problem because they use the 
sender’s IP address based filtering, which cannot prevent spoofing attacks originating from the 
network o f legitimate source.
8.2.3 Routing Security in Core Network
A multicast routing protocol creates a multicast distribution tree that effectively routes packets 
from the sender(s) to the receivers who are connected to the tree at its edges. Here multicast 
routers in several domains must maintain state information that allows a router to rout multicast 
packets pertaining to a group to the correct outgoing interfaces, to downstream multicast routers, 
and finally to the receivers.
In order for a unicast or a multicast routing protocol to behave correctly, all the control packets 
exchanged among the routers implementing the protocol must be protected against malicious 
modifications and deletions, and insertions o f bogus control packets. This is true for both unicast 
and multicast routers, since routing tables in routers are often shared between the unicast 
protocols and the multicast protocols, and the actual shape o f the multicast distribution tree is 
determined to a large extent by the unicast routing table.
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